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Conceptualizing Privacy 
Daniel J. Solove 
 In this Article, Professor Solove develops a new approach for 
conceptualizing privacy. He begins by examining the existing discourse 
about conceptualizing privacy, exploring the conceptions of a wide array 
of jurists, legal scholars, philosophers, psychologists, and sociologists. 
Solove contends that the theories are either too narrow or too broad. With 
a few exceptions, the discourse seeks to conceptualize privacy by isolating 
one or more common “essential” or “core” characteristics of privacy. 
Expounding upon Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notion of “family resemblances,” 
Solove contends that privacy is better understood as drawing from a 
common pool of similar characteristics. Rather than search for an 
overarching concept, Solove advances a pragmatic approach to 
conceptualizing privacy. According to Solove, when we talk about privacy, 
we are really talking about related dimensions of particular practices. We 
should explore what it means for something to be private contextually by 
looking at privacy problems:  instances of particular forms of disruption to 
particular practices. Solove demonstrates how practices involving privacy 
have changed throughout history and explains the appropriate way to as-
sess the value of privacy. 
Introduction 
 Currently, privacy is a sweeping concept, encompassing (among other 
things) freedom of thought, control over one’s body, solitude in one’s 
home, control over information about oneself, freedom from surveillance, 
protection of one’s reputation, and protection from searches and interroga-
tions. Time and again philosophers, legal theorists, and jurists have la-
mented the great difficulty in reaching a satisfying conception of privacy.1 
Arthur Miller has declared that privacy is “difficult to define because it is 
exasperatingly vague and evanescent.”2 According to Julie Inness, the legal 
and philosophical discourse of privacy is in a state of “chaos.”3 Alan 
Westin has stated that “[f]ew values so fundamental to society as privacy 
                                                                                                                          
 1. See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 Yale L.J. 421, 422 (1980) 
(lamenting the lack of a useful, distinct, and coherent concept of privacy). 
 2. ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY:  COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 
25 (1971). 
 3. JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 3 (1992). 
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have been left so undefined in social theory . . . .”4 William Beaney has 
noted that “even the most strenuous advocate of a right to privacy must 
confess that there are serious problems of defining the essence and scope of 
this right.”5 Privacy has “a protean capacity to be all things to all lawyers,”6 
Tom Gerety has observed. According to Robert Post, “[p]rivacy is a value 
so complex, so entangled in competing and contradictory dimensions, so 
engorged with various and distinct meanings, that I sometimes despair 
whether it can be usefully addressed at all.”7 Several theorists have sur-
veyed the interests that the law protects under the rubric of privacy and 
have concluded that they are distinct and unrelated.8 Judith Thompson has 
even argued that privacy as a concept serves no useful function, for what 
we call privacy really amounts to a set of other more primary interests.9 
 The widespread discontent over conceptualizing privacy persists even 
though the concern over privacy has escalated into an essential issue for 
freedom and democracy. To begin to solve some of the problems of pri-
vacy, we must develop an approach to conceptualizing privacy to guide 
policymaking and legal interpretation. Although the domain of law relating 
to privacy has made significant strides in dealing with privacy problems, it 
has thus far suffered numerous failures and difficulties in resolving them. 
Why does such a diverse body of law seem so outmatched and unsuited for 
the privacy problems we are currently experiencing? In a world constantly 
                                                                                                                          
 4. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). 
 5. William M. Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 
253, 255 (1966). 
 6. Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 233, 234 (1977); see also J. 
Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 5.7  [E]  (1999) (“It is apparent that 
the word ‘privacy’ has proven to be a powerful rhetorical battle cry in a plethora of unrelated 
contexts . . . . Like the emotive word ‘freedom,’ ‘privacy’ means so many different things to so many 
different people that it has lost any precise legal connotation that it might once have had.”); Robert 
Gellman, Does Privacy Work?, in Technology and Privacy:  The New Landscape 193 (Philip E. 
Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997) (stating that privacy can be a broad and almost limitless issue); 
Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 34, 34 (1967) (stating that we can readily 
recognize a threat to privacy “yet stumble when trying to make clear what privacy is”); Glenn Negley, 
Philosophical Views on the Value of Privacy, 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 319, 320 (1966) (“[T]he 
question of privacy has rarely been directly discussed in moral thought.”); Judith Jarvis Thomson, The 
Right to Privacy, in Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy 272 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 
1984) (“Perhaps the most striking thing about the right to privacy is that nobody seems to have any 
very clear idea what it is.”). 
 7. Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 Geo. L.J. 2087, 2087 (2001). 
 8. See, e.g., Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1335, 1339 
(“[L]egal privacy consists of four or five different species of legal rights which are quite distinct from 
each other and thus incapable of a single definition.”); William L. Prosser, Privacy [A Legal Analysis], 
in Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy, supra note 6, at 104, 107 (“The law of privacy comprises 
four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the 
common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common. . . .”); McCarthy, supra note 6, § 
5.7  [B]  5-60 to 5-61 (noting agreement among commentators “that the only significant thing that the 
Constitutional right of privacy and the common law right of privacy share is the label”). 
 9. Thomson, supra note 6, at 281. 
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being transformed by technology, how can we erect a robust and effective 
law of privacy when the ground is constantly shifting?  
 The difficulty in articulating what privacy is and why it is important 
has often made privacy law ineffective and blind to the larger purposes for 
which it must serve. Judicial opinions and statutes often depend upon some 
notion of the definition and value of privacy. Fourth Amendment law looks 
to whether a person has a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”10 The tort of 
public disclosure of private facts applies only to “matter[s] concerning the 
private life of another.”11 The tort of intrusion upon seclusion also requires 
a determination of what is private, applying to intrusions “upon the  
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns.”12 Like-
wise, the constitutional right to information privacy, originating in Whalen 
v. Roe,13 is predicated upon a conception of privacy.14 Additionally, the 
numerous federal and state laws addressing privacy concerns depend upon 
an implicit conception of privacy, which informs what matters are pro-
tected and the nature and scope of the particular protections employed.15 
 Judges, politicians, and scholars have often failed to adequately con-
ceptualize the problems that privacy law is asked to redress. Privacy prob-
lems are often not well articulated, and as a result, we frequently do not 
have a compelling account of what is at stake when privacy is threatened 
and what precisely the law must do to solve these problems. Thus, the need 
to conceptualize privacy is significant; yet the discourse about conceptual-
izing privacy remains deeply dissatisfying. 
 In this Article, I set forth a new approach for conceptualizing privacy. 
In doing so, I make two principal arguments. First, I contend that, with a 
few exceptions, the discourse seeks to conceptualize privacy in terms of 
necessary and sufficient conditions. In other words, most theorists attempt 
to conceptualize privacy by isolating one or more common “essential” or 
                                                                                                                          
 10. The “reasonable expectation of privacy” test currently employed by the Court to determine 
the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to a particular situation was first articulated in Justice 
Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). A person must demonstrate 
an “actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” and “the expectation [must] be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
 12. Id. § 652B. 
 13. 429 U.S. 589 (1977); see also Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
 14. The constitutional right to information privacy is derived from the substantive due process 
right to privacy originating in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and it protects “the 
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.” Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600. A number 
of circuit courts have recognized the constitutional right to information privacy. See, e.g., Barry v. City 
of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 
F.2d 570, 577-80 (3d Cir. 1980); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 15. See, e.g., Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2002); 
Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2002); Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 
1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2002); Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
6501-6503 (2002); Privacy Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2709 (2002); Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2002). 
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“core” characteristics of privacy. In contrast, I argue that privacy is better 
understood by drawing from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notion of “family  
resemblances.”16 As Wittgenstein suggests, certain concepts might not have 
a single common characteristic; rather they draw from a common pool of 
similar elements.17 
 Second, I propound a pragmatic approach to conceptualizing privacy. 
Although pragmatism encompasses a diverse range of theories,18 certain 
ideas recur among many pragmatists. Pragmatism focuses on the palpable 
consequences of ideas rather than on their correspondence to an ultimate 
reality; urges philosophers to become more ensconced in the problems of 
everyday life; adapts theory to respond to flux and change rather than seek-
ing to isolate fixed and immutable general principles; and emphasizes the 
importance of the concrete, historical, and factual circumstances of life.19 I 
identify my approach as “pragmatic” because it emphasizes the contextual 
                                                                                                                          
 16. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 66-67 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., 1958). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Pragmatism was originally developed by Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, John 
Dewey, Josiah Royce, George Herbert Mead, and others. For more background about the origins of 
pragmatism, see Richard Shusterman, Practicing Philosophy:  Pragmatism and the 
Philosophical Life (1997); John J. Stuhr, Genealogical Pragmatism:  Philosophy, 
Experience, and Community (1997); Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain:  Deference, Judicial 
Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 941, 970-71 (1999). A number of prominent 
contemporary scholars identify themselves as pragmatists, such as Richard Rorty, Judge Richard 
Posner, Cornell West, Robin West, Daniel Farber, and Thomas Grey. See Richard A. Posner, 
Overcoming Law (1995); Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism:  Essays, 1977-1980 
(1982); Cornell West, Keeping Faith:  Philosophy and Race in America (1993); Daniel A. 
Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 1331 (1988); Thomas C. Grey, 
Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 787, 814 (1989); Robin West, Liberalism 
Rediscovered:  A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision, 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 673 (1985). For 
critical views of the “new” legal pragmatism, see David Luban, Legal Modernism 125-78 (1997); 
Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 Yale L.J. 409 (1990); William Weaver, Why 
Pragmatism? The Puzzling Place of Pragmatism in Critical Theory, 1993 U. Ill. L. Rev. 535. 
Although many of the contemporary scholars who identify themselves as pragmatists share certain 
ideas and assumptions, they also have profound differences—sometimes more differences than 
similarities. 
 19. When I use the term “pragmatism” and “pragmatic,” I am using it as a shorthand for a variety 
of ideas propounded by different thinkers. John Dewey declared that:   
[I]t is better to view pragmatism quite vaguely as part and parcel of a general movement of 
intellectual reconstruction. For otherwise we seem to have no recourse save to define 
pragmatism . . . in terms of the very past systems against which it is a reaction; or, in escaping 
that alternative, to regard it as a fixed rival system making like claim to completeness and 
finality.  
JOHN DEWEY, THE INFLUENCE OF DARWIN ON PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS, at x-xi (Prometheus 
Books ed., 1997) (1910).  
 Recently, several legal scholars have declared a renaissance of pragmatism in legal theory. See 
Symposium, The Revival of Pragmatism, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1 (1996); Symposium, The Renaissance 
of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1569 (1990); see also Morris 
Dickstein, The Revival of Pragmatism:  New Essays on Social Thought, Law, and Culture 
(1998); Pragmatism in Law and Society (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991); Robert 
Samuel Summers, Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory (1982). 
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and dynamic nature of privacy. My approach diverges from traditional ac-
counts of privacy that seek to conceptualize it in general terms as an over-
arching category with necessary and sufficient conditions. In other words, I 
suggest an approach to conceptualize privacy from the bottom up rather 
than the top down, from particular contexts rather than in the abstract. 
 In Part I, I begin by examining the existing discourse about conceptu-
alizing privacy. I explore the conceptions of a wide array of jurists, legal 
scholars, philosophers, psychologists, and sociologists. Despite what ap-
pears to be a welter of different conceptions of privacy, I argue that they 
can be dealt with under six general headings, which capture the recurrent 
ideas in the discourse. These headings include:  (1)  the right to be let 
alone—Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s famous formulation for the 
right to privacy;  (2)  limited access to the self—the ability to shield  
oneself from unwanted access by others;  (3)  secrecy—the concealment of 
certain matters from others;  (4)  control over personal information— 
the ability to exercise control over information about oneself; 
(5)  personhood—the protection of one’s personality, individuality, and 
dignity; and  (6)  intimacy—control over, or limited access to, one’s inti-
mate relationships or aspects of life. Some of the conceptions concentrate 
on means to achieve privacy; others focus on the ends or goals of privacy. 
Further, there is overlap between conceptions, and the conceptions dis-
cussed under different headings are by no means independent from each 
other. For example, control over personal information can be seen as a sub-
set of limited access to the self, which in turn bears significant similarities 
to the right to be let alone. These headings are therefore not taxonomical; 
rather, they track how scholars have chosen to theorize about privacy. I use 
the headings to discuss the primary representatives of conceptual ap-
proaches in the discourse.  
 In examining the discourse, I survey the criticisms of various scholars 
regarding each other’s conceptions of privacy and suggest a number of 
criticisms of my own. Looking broadly at the discourse, almost all of the 
criticisms boil down to claims that the theories are either too narrow or too 
broad.  
 In Part II, I contend that attempts to conceptualize privacy by locating 
the common denominator to identify all instances of privacy have thus far 
been unsatisfying. Wittgenstein’s notion of “family resemblances” sug-
gests that there are other ways to conceptualize beyond a search for the 
common denominator. Expanding on Wittgenstein’s notion, I then develop 
a pragmatic approach to conceptualizing privacy, seeking to understand 
privacy in terms of practices. By “practices,” I am referring to activities, 
customs, norms, and traditions. Under my approach, privacy is not reduci-
ble to a set of neutral conditions that apply to all matters we deem private. 
Rather, to say that a particular matter is “private” or to talk about “privacy” 
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in the abstract is to make a generalization about particular practices. These 
practices are a product of history and culture. Therefore, we should explore 
what it means for something to be private contextually by looking at par-
ticular practices. I illustrate these points by looking historically at certain 
matters Western societies have long understood as private:  the family, the 
body, and the home. 
 Following philosopher John Dewey’s view that philosophical inquiry 
should begin as a response to dealing with life’s problems and difficul-
ties,20 I explain that privacy should be conceptualized contextually as it is 
implicated in particular problems. When we protect privacy, we protect 
against disruptions to certain practices. A privacy invasion interferes with 
the integrity of certain practices and even destroys or inhibits such prac-
tices. “Privacy” is a general term that refers to the practices we want to 
protect and to the protections against disruptions to these practices. I sug-
gest that instead of attempting to locate the common denominator of these 
practices, we should conceptualize privacy by focusing on the specific 
types of disruption and the specific practices disrupted.  
 Next, I turn to an account of how privacy should be valued. Privacy 
does not have a universal value that is the same across all contexts. The 
value of privacy in a particular context depends upon the social importance 
of the practice of which it is a part.  
 Finally, I examine some applications of my approach. With a series of 
examples, I illustrate how privacy law has fixed itself too firmly to certain 
conceptions of privacy, and as a result, has lost flexibility in dealing with 
emerging privacy problems. I then demonstrate how my approach can help 
courts conceptualize privacy in ways better adapted to address emerging 
issues.  
I 
A Critique of the Conceptions of Privacy 
 What is privacy? We all have some intuitive sense that there are cer-
tain aspects of life that are “private” and view these aspects of life as re-
lated to each other. But what does it mean when we say that these aspects 
of life are “private”?  
 This question is very important for making legal and policy decisions. 
Many recognize the importance of privacy for freedom, democracy, social 
welfare, individual well-being, and other ends. Many also assert it is worth 
protecting at significant cost. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis spoke 
of the profound importance of establishing and safeguarding a right to pri-
vacy, describing such a right as “the most comprehensive of rights and the 
right most valued by civilized men.”21 Society’s commitment to privacy 
                                                                                                                          
 20. See John Dewey, Logic, The Theory of Inquiry 106-10 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1988). 
 21. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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often entails restraining or even sacrificing interests of substantial impor-
tance, such as freedom of speech and press, efficient law enforcement, ac-
cess to information, and so on. Why is privacy valuable enough to make 
significant trade-offs to protect it? To answer this question, we need to 
have some notion of what privacy is. When we protect “privacy,” what are 
we protecting?  
 Traditionally, theorists of privacy have attempted to locate the essen-
tial elements common to the aspects of life we deem “private” and then 
formulate a conception based on these elements. A robust discourse has 
developed about conceptualizing privacy, and a multitude of different con-
ceptions of privacy have been proposed and critiqued.  
 Although the extensive scholarly and judicial writing on privacy has 
produced a horde of different conceptions of privacy, I believe that they 
can be discussed under six headings:  (1)  the right to be let alone;  (2)  lim-
ited access to the self;  (3)  secrecy;  (4)  control of personal informa-
tion;  (5)  personhood; and  (6)  intimacy. These headings often overlap, yet 
each has a distinctive perspective on privacy. In this Part, I delve into the 
extensive literature on the subject, analyzing and critiquing the privacy 
conceptions set forth in judicial opinions and legal scholarship as well as in 
works by philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, and others.  
 My own approach to conceptualizing privacy emerges from studying 
various problems in the discourse. Thus, I have attempted to provide a 
comprehensive overview of the discourse to reveal that various parts of it 
suffer from similar problems; that theorists are often dissatisfied with the 
discourse because of these problems; and that the discourse has by and 
large failed to transcend these difficulties.  
 The most prevalent problem with the conceptions is that they are ei-
ther too narrow or too broad. The conceptions are often too narrow because 
they fail to include the aspects of life that we typically view as private, and 
are often too broad because they fail to exclude matters that we do not 
deem private. Often, the same conceptions can suffer from being both too 
narrow and too broad. I contend that these problems stem from the way 
that the discourse goes about the task of conceptualizing privacy. 
 In this Part, I spend considerable time discussing what I call the  
“discourse” about conceptualizing privacy. Although I often refer to the 
discourse as a whole, I do not claim that all privacy theorists are engaged 
in a dialogue with each other or that any statements about the discourse 
apply to every theorist who has examined privacy. Whenever we seek to 
theorize about a topic, we must do so amidst the background noise of dif-
fering terminology, contrasting definitions of the same terms, and diverg-
ing theories of supporting and interconnecting concepts. Therefore, when I 
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talk about the discourse as a whole, I am making generalizations about the 
discourse and attempting to eliminate some of the background noise.  
 Since my critique is ultimately of the discourse’s methods and aims in 
conceptualizing privacy, it is important to begin with some background 
about methods of conceptualizing. 
A. Methods of Conceptualizing 
1. The Traditional Method 
 When we conceptualize privacy, what are we attempting to do? Under 
what I will refer to as the “traditional method,” conceptualizing privacy is 
understood as an attempt to articulate what separates privacy from other 
things, what makes it unique, and what identifies it in its various manifes-
tations.  
 Most attempts to conceptualize privacy thus far have followed the 
traditional method of conceptualizing. The majority of theorists conceptu-
alize privacy by defining it per genus et differentiam. In other words, theo-
rists look for a common set of necessary and sufficient elements that single 
out privacy as unique from other conceptions.22  
 A conception of privacy is different from the usage of the word  
“privacy.” The usage of the word “privacy” constitutes the ways in which 
we employ the word in everyday life and the things we are referring to 
when we speak of “privacy.” The word “privacy” is currently used to de-
scribe a myriad of different things: freedom of thought, control over per-
sonal information, freedom from surveillance, protection of one’s 
reputation, protection from invasions into one’s home, the ability to pre-
vent disclosure of facts about oneself, and an almost endless series of other 
things.  
 According to the traditional method of conceptualizing, a conception 
is a category, an abstract mental picture of what makes privacy distinct 
from other things and the criteria for what makes things fall within the 
category. People can use the word “privacy” improperly by referring to 
things outside the category or by not referring to things within the  
category. The purpose of conceptualizing is to define the unique  
                                                                                                                          
 22. See, e.g., Inness, supra note 3, at 56 (noting that intimacy is the “common denominator” of 
privacy); Miller, supra note 2, at 25 (stating that control is the “basic attribute” of privacy); David M. 
O’Brien, Privacy, Law, and Public Policy 16 (1979) (conceptualizing privacy as “fundamentally 
denoting an existential condition of limited access”); Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of 
Human Dignity:  An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 963 (1964) (proposing a 
“general theory of individual privacy which will reconcile the divergent strands of legal development”); 
Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale L.J. 475, 475 (1968) (seeking to “isolate from restrictions and 
intrusions in general whatever is peculiar about invasions of privacy”); Gavison, supra note 1, at 423 
(developing a “distinct and coherent” conception of privacy); Gerety, supra note 6, at 263 (“Intimacy is 
the chief restricting concept in the definition of privacy.”); Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 
27 Rutgers L. Rev. 275, 277 (1974) (seeking to articulate “some characteristic common to all or some 
of [a list of invasions of ‘different personal interests’]”); see also infra Part I.B.  
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characteristics of privacy; usage of the word “privacy” must then be 
cleaned up to match the conceptual category of privacy. Given the great 
difficulties of capturing everything referred to by “privacy,” the often dis-
parate ways that the word “privacy” is used, and the lack of agreement over 
the precise meaning of the word, many scholars seek to establish clear cri-
teria to distinguish “privacy” from other things. A few things might be left 
out, but the aim is to establish a conception that encompasses most of the 
things that are commonly viewed under the rubric of “privacy.”  
 Although the terminologies theorists employ differ, most theorists 
strive toward the central goals of the traditional method of conceptualizing 
privacy:  to locate the “essence” of privacy, the core common denominator 
that makes things private.23 The traditional method endeavors to conceptu-
alize privacy by constructing a category that is separate from other concep-
tual categories (such as autonomy, freedom, and so on) and that has fixed 
clear boundaries so we can know when things fall within the category or 
outside of it.  
 Under the traditional method, how are conceptions of privacy to be 
evaluated? The traditional method looks to determine whether a conception 
of privacy accurately captures what privacy is. Most often, theorists assess 
a conception by determining whether it is coherent—that is, whether it is 
logical and consistent. Coherence alone, however, would be incomplete as 
a way to evaluate a conception of privacy. Thus, in addition to coherence, 
theorists often look to the usage of the word “privacy.” They examine 
whether a conception of privacy includes the things we view as private and 
excludes the things we do not. For example, if a conception of privacy 
were to omit things we commonly view as private—such as medical in-
formation, intimate marital secrets, freedom from surveillance, and so on—
theorists would likely reject the conception.24 A successful conception thus 
aims to get close to the modern usage of the word “privacy,” yet maintain 
coherence by identifying a combination of common elements that are 
unique to privacy.25 This is certainly not the only way to evaluate concep-
tions of privacy, but it is the way most often used by theorists in the dis-
course. 
2. Wittgensteinian Family Resemblances 
 I draw on some of the ideas of philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein to 
demonstrate that the traditional method is not the only way to approach the 
task of conceptualizing. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was an Austrian 
philosopher who focused extensively on problems in language and logic. In 
                                                                                                                          
 23. This will be illustrated in depth infra Part I.B. 
 24. For specific examples, see the discussion of the conceptions of privacy infra Part I.B. 
 25. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 22, at 277 (stating that “[o]ur definition of privacy should 
be . . . true (fit the data)”). 
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a posthumous work, Philosophical Investigations, written during the latter 
part of his career,26 Wittgenstein embarks on the task of critiquing the tra-
ditional conception of language. According to the traditional view of lan-
guage, we should endeavor to locate the essence of a word or expression, 
to strive toward “making our expressions more exact.”27 In contrast,  
Wittgenstein suggests that meaning is not an objectively true link between 
a word and the things to which it refers. Rather, the meaning of a word 
comes from the way a word is used in language, not from any inherent 
connection between the word and what it signifies.28  
 Wittgenstein demonstrates a way to conceptualize language apart 
from the traditional method of conceptualizing. Specifically, he explains 
that language does not have a single essence but involves a horde of differ-
ent activities29 which have “no one thing in common” but “are related to 
one another in many different ways.”30 Thus, in examining the concept of 
language, Wittgenstein suggests that certain concepts might not share one 
common characteristic; rather they draw from a common pool of similar 
characteristics, “a complicated network of similarities overlapping and 
criss-crossing:  sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of 
detail.”31 He illustrates this point by using the example of various types of 
games:  “board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so 
on.”32 There is not “something that is common to all, but similarities,  
relationships, and a whole series of them at that.”33 There are “many  
correspondences” between board games and card games, “but many  
common features drop out, and others appear.”34 Wittgenstein uses the term 
“family resemblances,” analogizing to the overlapping and crisscrossing 
characteristics that exist between members of a family, such as “build,  
                                                                                                                          
 26. After publishing his highly influential Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in 1921, Wittgenstein 
disappeared from the philosophical scene for over a decade. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus (D.F. Pears & B.F. McGuiness trans., 1961). When he returned, he had 
substantially altered his views, recognizing that he had made “grave mistakes” in Tractatus. See 
Wittgenstein, supra note 16, at vi. Because Wittgenstein’s thinking changed dramatically during his 
career, Tractatus is often referred to as “early” Wittgenstein, and Philosophical Investigations, along 
with other works such as On Certainty, are referred to as “late” Wittgenstein. 
 27. Wittgenstein, supra note 16, § 91. 
 28. Id. § 43 (“[T]he meaning of a word is its use in the language.”).  
 29. Wittgenstein uses the term “language-games” to describe the activities involving language. 
Id. § 7. Wittgenstein uses “games” as a metaphor to describe language as an active endeavor such as 
playing chess, tennis, or a card game. Wittgenstein thus sees language not as an abstract system of signs 
but as a functioning aspect of our daily lives, as something we do, as a “form of life.” Id. § 19. There 
are a “multiplicity” of language-games, such as giving orders, describing appearances, reporting an 
event, speculating, singing, telling a joke, and so on. See id. § 23.  
 30. Id. § 65. 
 31. Id. § 66.  
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
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features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc.”35 For example, in a fam-
ily, each child has certain features similar to each parent; and the children 
share similar features with each other; but they may not all resemble each 
other in the same way. Nevertheless, they all bear a resemblance to each 
other.  
 Using another analogy, the traditional method of conceptualizing 
views things as spokes linked by the hub of a wheel, all connected by a 
common point. This common point, where all spokes overlap, defines the 
way in which the spokes are related to each other. However, Wittgenstein 
suggests that sometimes there is no hub. We have a web of connected 
parts, but with no single center point. Yet the parts are still connected.36  
 One might make the objection that a conception consisting of a web 
of connected parts without a common denominator is deficient because it 
has no boundaries and thus is endless. Although Wittgenstein suggests that 
not all conceptions are “closed by a frontier,”37 this does not mean that 
conceptions are endless. Rather, it means that not all conceptions have 
fixed and sharp boundaries separating them from other conceptions. 
Boundaries can be fuzzy or can be in a state of constant flux.38 We can 
draw fixed and sharp boundaries, but we do so for special purposes, not 
because the boundary is a necessary part of a conception.39 As Wittgenstein 
asserts, conceptions can still be useful without having to be circumscribed 
by fixed and sharp boundaries.40 
 The ramification of Wittgenstein’s insight is not that all attempts to 
conceptualize by locating a common denominator are doomed; rather, 
Wittgenstein suggests that there are other ways to approach the conceptu-
alization of certain things. As Judith Genova characterizes Wittgenstein’s 
insight:  “Once one sees the variety of cases and the family resemblances 
between them, the attempt to establish an a priori generalization is 
thwarted. There is no one answer, but a variety of answers depending on a 
                                                                                                                          
 35. Id. § 67. For more background into Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblances, see P.M.S. 
HACKER, INSIGHT AND ILLUSION:  THEMES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF WITTGENSTEIN 131-34 (1986); 
HANNA FEINCHEL PITKIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE:  ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LUDWIG 
WITTGENSTEIN FOR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 63-65 (1972).  
 36. In his excellent recent book, Steven Winter develops a related view of conceptualization. He 
argues:  “On the standard view, categories are descriptive, definitional, and rigidly bounded. The 
empirical evidence, in contrast, presents a picture of categorization as an imaginative and dynamic 
process that is flexible in application and elastic in scope.” Steven L. Winter, A Clearing in the 
Forest:  Law, Life, and Mind 69 (2001). Winter contends that categories are “radial”; they consist of 
a “central model” or paradigm example and related extensions radiating outward. Id. at 71. These 
related extensions, “though related to the central case in some fashion, nevertheless cannot be generated 
by rule.” Id.  
 37. Wittgenstein, supra note 16, § 68. 
 38. Wittgenstein uses the terms “blurred edges” and “indistinct picture.” Id. § 71. 
 39. See generally id. §§ 69, 499; see also Winter, supra note 36, at 100-01 (contending that 
categories are not static entities but are tools created for particular purposes).  
 40. Wittgenstein, supra note 16, § 69. 
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variety of factors. The moral is:  Look to the circumstances!”41 Shifting the 
focus away from finding a common denominator may prove immensely 
fruitful. The top-down approach of beginning with an overarching concep-
tion of privacy designed to apply in all contexts often results in a concep-
tion that does not fit well when applied to the multitude of situations and 
problems involving privacy.  
 In contrast to the view of the traditional method, where the quest for a 
common denominator or essence leads to greater clarity, Wittgenstein 
shows us that such a quest can sometimes lead to confusion. I contend that 
this explains the problems currently experienced in the discourse. 
 In the remainder of this Part, I will illustrate these rather abstract ideas 
by examining the various attempts to conceptualize privacy, and will dem-
onstrate the difficulties of conceptions of privacy that seek to isolate its 
core characteristics.  
B. Conceptions of Privacy 
 As I have discussed before, the philosophical discourse about privacy 
has proposed numerous conceptions that attempt to capture the common 
denominator of privacy. Wittgenstein demonstrates that not all conceptions 
have a “core” or “essence.” Is privacy such a conception?  
 In this section, I explore the philosophical and legal discourse to as-
sess the conceptions that attempt to isolate a common denominator of pri-
vacy. Although I am critical of most conceptions of privacy, I do not intend 
to imply that the discourse is devoid of merit. In fact, many of the concep-
tions capture profound insights about privacy. However, each of the con-
ceptions has significant limitations if it is to serve as a conceptual account 
of privacy in general. Beyond the specific critiques of each general cate-
gory of conceptions, I aim to illustrate my overarching critique about the 
predominant approach of the discourse toward conceptualizing privacy.42  
1. The Right to Be Let Alone 
 In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis penned their famous ar-
ticle, The Right to Privacy,43 hailed by a multitude of scholars as the  
                                                                                                                          
 41. JUDITH GENOVA, WITTGENSTEIN:  A WAY OF SEEING 44 (1995).  
 42. In some instances, the theorists I discuss under one heading are also discussed under other 
headings, since some theorists have combined one or more conceptions. For example, Charles Fried, 
who advocates a control-over-information conception, defines the scope of information over which we 
should have control by using an intimacy conception. See infra Parts I.B.4 & I.B.6. Further, the Court’s 
jurisprudence on privacy reveals influences of many conceptions, and collectively, it does not reflect a 
single conception of privacy. Nevertheless, the Court readily adopts a particular conception of privacy 
for particular areas of law, such as Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the constitutional right to 
privacy, federal statutes, and so on.  
 43. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). 
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foundation of privacy law in the United States.44 The influence of the  
Warren and Brandeis article cannot be questioned—the article inspired 
significant interest in and attention to privacy; it spawned at least four 
common law tort actions to protect privacy; and it framed the discussion of 
privacy in the United States throughout the twentieth century.45  
 Warren and Brandeis began by noting new technological develop-
ments that were posing a potential threat to privacy and focused on how the 
common law could develop to protect the interest then called “privacy.” 
The authors, however, did not spend much time setting forth a conceptual 
account of privacy. Warren and Brandeis defined privacy as the “right to 
be let alone,”46 a phrase adopted from Judge Thomas Cooley’s famous trea-
tise on torts in 1880.47 Cooley’s right to be let alone was, in fact, a way of 
explaining that attempted physical touching was a tort injury; he was not 
defining a right to privacy.48 Warren and Brandeis’s use of the phrase was 
consistent with the purpose of their article:  to demonstrate that many of 
the elements of a right to privacy existed within the common law. 
 The authors declared that the underlying principle of privacy was 
“that of inviolate personality.”49 They noted that the value of privacy “is 
found not in the right to take the profits arising from publication, but in the 
peace of mind or the relief afforded by the ability to prevent any  
publication at all.”50 Warren and Brandeis observed that increasingly, 
“modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his pri-
vacy, subjected [an individual] to mental pain and distress, far greater than 
could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.”51 The authors noted that this type 
of harm was not typically protected by tort law. While the law of  
                                                                                                                          
 44. See, e.g., Irwin P. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law:  A Century Since Warren and Brandeis, 
39 Cath. U. L. Rev. 703, 704 (1990). Harry Kalven has even hailed it as the “most influential law 
review article of all.” Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 
Law & Contemp. Probs. 326, 327 (1966). 
 45. See, e.g., Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article:  The Emerging 
Unencumbered Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 10 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 479, 481-82 
(1990). Turkington observed: 
[T]he article has acquired legendary status in the realm of legal scholarship. It is likely that 
The Right to Privacy has had as much impact on the development of law as any single 
publication in legal periodicals. It is certainly one of the most commented upon and cited 
articles in the history of our legal system. 
Id. 
 46. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 43, at 193. 
 47. Thomas M. Cooley, Law of Torts (2d ed. 1888). Around the same time that Warren and 
Brandeis published their article, the Supreme Court referred to the right to be let alone in holding that a 
court could not require a plaintiff in a civil case to submit to a surgical examination:  “As well said by 
Judge Cooley:  ‘The right to one’s person may be said to be a right of complete immunity; to be let 
alone.’” Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
 48. ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE:  PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM 
PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 128 (2000).  
 49. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 43, at 205. 
 50. Id. at 200. 
 51. Id. at 196.  
2002] CONCEPTUALIZING PRIVACY 1101 
 
defamation protected injuries to reputations, privacy involved “injury to 
the feelings,” a psychological form of pain that was difficult to translate 
into the tort law of their times, which focused more on tangible injuries.52  
 Nearly forty years later, when he was a justice on the Supreme Court, 
Brandeis wrote his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States.53 In 
Olmstead, the Court held that wiretapping was not a violation under the 
Fourth Amendment because it was not a physical trespass into the home.54 
Brandeis fired off a dissent that was to become one of the most important 
documents for Fourth Amendment privacy law, stating that the Framers of 
the Constitution “conferred, as against the government, the right to be let 
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civi-
lized men.”55 
 Brandeis’s article and his dissent in Olmstead have had a profound 
impact on the law of privacy and on subsequent theories of privacy. In Katz 
v. United States,56 the Court adopted Brandeis’s view, overruling 
Olmstead. In its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as well as its substan-
tive due process protection of the right to privacy, the Court frequently has 
invoked Brandeis’s formulation of privacy as “the right to be let alone.”57 
“[The right to privacy] is, simply stated, the right to be let alone,” Justice 
Fortas observed, “to live one’s life as one chooses, free from assault,  
intrusion or invasion except as they can be justified by the clear needs of 
community living under a government of law.”58 According to Justice 
Douglas: 
[The] right of privacy was called by Mr. Justice Brandeis the right 
“to be let alone.” That right includes the privilege of an individual 
to plan his own affairs, for “outside areas of plainly harmful  
conduct, every American is left to shape his own life as he thinks 
best, do what he pleases, go where he pleases.”59 
 The formulation of privacy as the right to be let alone merely de-
scribes an attribute of privacy. Understanding privacy as being let alone 
fails to provide much guidance about how privacy should be valued vis-à-
vis other interests, such as free speech, effective law enforcement, and 
other important values. Being let alone does not inform us about the mat-
ters in which we should be let alone. Warren and Brandeis did speak of 
“inviolate personality,” which could be viewed as describing the content of 
                                                                                                                          
 52. Id. at 197.  
 53. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 54. See id. at 466. 
 55. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 56. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 57. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 n.10 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 
557, 564 (1969); Katz, 389 U.S. at 350. 
 58. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 413 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
 59. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958)).  
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the private sphere, but this phrase is vague, and the authors failed to elabo-
rate. To the extent that being let alone refers to “noninterference by the 
state,” legal scholar Ruth Gavison argues, it often neglects to understand 
that “the typical privacy claim is not a claim for noninterference by the 
state at all. It is a claim for state interference in the form of legal protection 
against other individuals.”60 
 The right to be let alone views privacy as a type of immunity or seclu-
sion. As many commentators lament, defining privacy as the right to be let 
alone is too broad.61 For example, legal scholar Anita Allen explains:  “If 
privacy simply meant ‘being let alone,’ any form of offensive or harmful 
conduct directed toward another person could be characterized as a viola-
tion of personal privacy. A punch in the nose would be a privacy invasion 
as much as a peep in the bedroom.”62 According to philosopher Ferdinand 
Schoeman, Warren and Brandeis “never define what privacy is.”63 Edward 
Bloustein, a noted legal theorist of privacy, observed that instead of devel-
oping a conception of privacy, Warren and Brandeis’s article focused 
mostly on the gaps in existing common-law torts.64 
 To its credit, the article was far ahead of its time, and it contained 
flashes of insight into a more robust theory of privacy. And to be fair,  
Warren and Brandeis’s aim was not to provide a comprehensive conception 
of privacy but instead to explore the roots of a right to privacy in the  
common law and explain how such a right could develop. The article was 
certainly a profound beginning toward developing a conception of privacy. 
However, while the right to be let alone has often been invoked by judges 
and commentators,65 it still remains a rather broad and vague conception of 
privacy.  
2. Limited Access to the Self 
 A number of theorists conceptualize privacy as “limited access” to the 
self.66 This conception recognizes the individual’s desire for concealment 
and for being apart from others. In this way, it is closely related to the 
right-to-be-let-alone conception, and is perhaps a more sophisticated for-
mulation of that right.  
                                                                                                                          
 60. Gavison, supra note 1, at 438. 
 61. See, e.g., O’Brien, supra note 22, at 5; Gerety, supra note 6, at 263.  
 62. Anita L. Allen, Uneasy Access:  Privacy for Women in a Free Society 7 (1988).  
 63. Ferdinand Schoeman, Privacy:  Philosophical Dimensions of the Literature, in 
Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy, supra note 6, at 1, 14. 
 64. See Bloustein, supra note 22, at 970.  
 65. See, e.g., J. Braxton Craven, Jr., Personhood:  The Right to Be Let Alone, 1976 Duke L.J. 
699. 
 66. In addition to the scholars discussed in this section, see, for example, Adam Carlyle 
Breckenridge, The Right to Privacy 1 (1970) (“Privacy, in my view, is the rightful claim of the 
individual to determine the extent to which he wishes to share of himself with others.”). 
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 The limited-access conception is not equivalent to solitude. Solitude is 
a form of seclusion, of withdrawal from other individuals, of being alone. 
Solitude is a component of limited-access conceptions as well as of the 
right-to-be-let-alone conception, but these theories extend far more broadly 
than solitude, embracing freedom from government interference as well as 
from intrusions by the press and others. Limited-access conceptions recog-
nize that privacy extends beyond merely being apart from others.  
 E.L. Godkin, a well-known writer of the late nineteenth century, ad-
vanced an early version of the limited-access theory when he observed that 
“nothing is better worthy of legal protection than private life, or, in other 
words, the right of every man to keep his affairs to himself, and to decide 
for himself to what extent they shall be the subject of public observation 
and discussion.”67 Around the same time as the publication of Warren and 
Brandeis’s article in 1890, Godkin published an article noting that privacy 
constituted the “right to decide how much knowledge of [a person’s]  
personal thought and feeling . . . private doings and affairs . . . the public at 
large shall have.”68   
 A number of contemporary theorists also have advanced limited-
access conceptions. For philosopher Sissela Bok, privacy is “the condition 
of being protected from unwanted access by others—either physical access, 
personal information, or attention.”69 Hyman Gross, a legal theorist of pri-
vacy, conceives of privacy as “the condition of human life in which ac-
quaintance with a person or with affairs of his life which are personal to 
him is limited.”70 According to Ernest Van Den Haag, “Privacy is the  
exclusive access of a person (or other legal entity) to a realm of his own. 
The right to privacy entitles one to exclude others 
from  (a)  watching,  (b)  utilizing,  (c)  invading (intruding upon, or in 
other ways affecting) his private realm.”71 Legal theorist Anita Allen  
asserts that “a degree of inaccessibility is an important necessary condition 
for the apt application of privacy.”72 
 David O’Brien argues that there is an important distinction among 
theorists who propound privacy as limited access formulations. Some view 
limited access as a choice, a form of individual control over who has access 
                                                                                                                          
 67. E.L. Godkin, Libel and Its Legal Remedy, 12 J. Soc. Sci. 69, 80 (1880). 
 68. E.L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen, IV—To His Own Reputation, Scribner’s Magazine, 
July-Dec. 1890, at 65. For a discussion of this article’s influence on Warren and Brandeis, see Richard 
C. Turkington & Anita L. Allen, Privacy Law:  Cases and Materials 40-41 (1999). 
 69. Sissela Bok, Secrets:  On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation 10-11 (1983). 
 70. Gross, supra note 6, at 35-36 (emphasis removed). 
 71. Ernest Van Den Haag, On Privacy, in Nomos XIII:  Privacy 149, 149 (J. Ronald Pennock & 
J.W. Chapman eds., 1971). 
 72. Allen, supra note 62, at 10. For an additional proponent of limited-access conceptions, see 
Edward Shils, Privacy:  Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 281, 281 (1966) 
(Privacy “is constituted by the absence of interaction or communication or perception within contexts 
in which such interaction, communication, or perception is practicable . . . .”). 
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to the self. Others view limited access as a state of existence. Arguing for 
the latter view, O’Brien claims that privacy “may be understood as  
fundamentally denoting an existential condition of limited access to an  
individual’s life experiences and engagements.”73 “Privacy is not identical 
with control over access to oneself, because not all privacy is chosen. Some 
privacy is accidental, compulsory, or even involuntary.”74  
 For O’Brien, privacy boils down to the condition of being alone. This 
suffers from two problems. First, O’Brien neglects to incorporate into his 
conception an approach toward understanding the content of the private 
sphere. Second, O’Brien’s conception omits any notion of the individual’s 
power to make certain choices about revealing aspects of herself to others. 
For example, O’Brien would claim that a person stranded on a deserted 
island has complete privacy, but this is better described as a state of isola-
tion. Privacy involves one’s relationship to society; in a world without oth-
ers, claiming that one has privacy does not make much sense. According to 
sociologist Barrington Moore, “the need for privacy is a socially created 
need. Without society there would be no need for privacy.”75 
 Without a notion of what matters are private, limited-access concep-
tions do not tell us the substantive matters for which access would impli-
cate privacy. Certainly not all access to the self infringes upon privacy—
only access to specific dimensions of the self or to particular matters and 
information. As a result, the theory provides no understanding of the de-
gree of access necessary to constitute a privacy violation. How much con-
trol we should have over access to the self? Proponents of the limited-
access conception could respond that privacy is a continuum between  
absolutely no access to the self and total access. If privacy is such a contin-
uum, then the important question is where the lines should be drawn—that 
is, what degree of access should we recognize as reasonable? This question 
can only be answered with an understanding of what matters are private 
and the value of privacy. Like the right-to-be-let-alone conception, the lim-
ited-access conception suffers from being too broad and too vague. 
 In Privacy and the Limits of Law, legal theorist Ruth Gavison, in an 
attempt to address these shortcomings, develops the most compelling con-
ception of privacy as limited access. Her aim is to define “a neutral concept 
of privacy” that is “distinct and coherent” because “the reasons for which 
we claim privacy in different situations are similar.”76 For Gavison, limited 
access is the common denominator of privacy:  “Our interest in  
privacy . . . is related to our concern over our accessibility to others:  the 
extent to which we are known to others, the extent to which others have 
                                                                                                                          
 73. O’Brien, supra note 22, at 16. 
 74. Id. at 15.  
 75. Barrington Moore, Jr., Privacy:  Studies in Social and Cultural History 73 (1984). 
 76. Gavison, supra note 1, at 423. 
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physical access to us, and the extent to which we are the subject of others’ 
attention.”77 According to Gavison, privacy cannot be understood “as a 
claim, a psychological state, or an area that should not be invaded . . . [or] 
as a form of control.”78 Unlike many limited access theorists who neglect 
to elaborate on the value of privacy, Gavison argues that privacy as limited 
access to the self is valuable in furthering liberty, autonomy, and free-
dom.79  
 Further, Gavison explains what constitutes limited access, which con-
sists of “three independent and irreducible elements:  secrecy, anonymity, 
and solitude.”80 However, the way that Gavison defines access restricts 
privacy to matters of withdrawal (solitude) and concealment (secrecy, ano-
nymity). Excluded from this definition are invasions into one’s private life 
by harassment and nuisance and the government’s involvement in deci-
sions regarding one’s body, health, sexual conduct, and family life.81 Al-
though Gavison contends that “the collection, storage, and computerization 
of information”82 falls within her conception, these activities often do not 
reveal secrets, destroy anonymity, or thwart solitude.83 Therefore, although 
Gavison avoids the broadness and vagueness of most limited-access con-
ceptions, her attempt to define what “access” entails winds up being too 
narrow. 
3. Secrecy 
 One of the most common understandings of privacy is that it consti-
tutes the secrecy of certain matters. Under this view, privacy is violated by 
the public disclosure of previously concealed information. According to 
Judge Richard Posner:   
[T]he word ‘privacy’ seems to embrace at least two distinct  
interests. One is the interest in being left alone—the interest that is 
invaded by the unwanted telephone solicitation, the noisy sound 
truck, the music in elevators, being jostled in the street, or even an 
obscene theater billboard or shouted obscenity. . . . The other  
privacy interest, concealment of information, is invaded whenever 
private information is obtained against the wishes of the person to 
whom the information pertains.84 
                                                                                                                          
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 426.  
 79. See id. at 423. 
 80. Id. at 433.  
 81. Gavison openly recognizes that her theory excludes these things. See id. at 436. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power:  Computer Databases and Metaphors for 
Information Privacy, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1393, 1422 (2001) (“The problem with databases emerges from 
subjecting personal information to the bureaucratic process with little intelligent control or limitation, 
resulting in a lack of meaningful participation in decisions about our information.”). 
 84. Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice 272-73 (1981). 
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The latter privacy interest, “concealment of information,” involves secrecy. 
When talking about privacy as secrecy, Posner defines it as an individual’s 
“right to conceal discreditable facts about himself.”85 Posner sees privacy 
as a form of self-interested economic behavior, concealing true but harmful 
facts about oneself for one’s own gain. People “want to manipulate the 
world around them by selective disclosure of facts about themselves.”86 
“[W]hen people today decry lack of privacy,” Posner argues, “what they 
want, I think, is mainly something quite different from seclusion; they want 
more power to conceal information about themselves that others might use 
to their disadvantage.”87 In a less normatively charged manner, Sidney 
Jourard emphasizes secrecy with his definition of privacy:  “Privacy is an 
outcome of a person’s wish to withhold from others certain knowledge as 
to his past and present experience and action and his intentions for the  
future.”88  
 The privacy-as-secrecy conception can be understood as a subset of 
limited access to the self. Secrecy of personal information is a way to limit 
access to the self. This conception is narrower than limited-access concep-
tions, as secrecy involves only one aspect of access to the self—the con-
cealment of personal facts. 
 The conception of privacy as concealing information about the self 
forms the foundation for what is known as the constitutional right to in-
formation privacy. The constitutional right to information privacy is an 
offshoot of the Supreme Court’s substantive due process “right to privacy” 
cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut89 and Roe v. Wade.90 In Whalen v. 
Roe,91 the Court held that the constitutionally protected “zone of privacy” 
not only protected an individual’s “independence in making certain kinds 
of important decisions” but also encompassed the “individual interest in 
avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”92 Consonant with the notion of 
privacy as secrecy, this formulation views privacy as avoiding disclosure. 
Accordingly, courts applying the constitutional right to information privacy 
have held that although confidential records (such as medical records) are 
                                                                                                                          
 85. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 46 (5th ed. 1998). 
 86. Posner, supra note 84, at 234. 
 87. Id. at 271. Posner’s conception of privacy is infused with his own normative assessment of 
privacy as a form of deception. According to Posner, “[t]he economist sees a parallel to the efforts of 
sellers to conceal defects in their products.” Posner, supra note 85 at 46. 
 88. Sidney M. Jourard, Some Psychological Aspects of Privacy, 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 
307, 307 (1966). 
 89. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 90. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 91. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
 92. Id. at 599-600. 
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protected under constitutional information privacy,93 nonconfidential records 
(such as arrest and conviction records) are not.94 
 In a variety of legal contexts, the view of privacy as secrecy often 
leads to the conclusion that once a fact is divulged in public, no matter how 
limited or narrow the disclosure, it can no longer remain private. Privacy is 
thus viewed as coextensive with the total secrecy of information. For ex-
ample, the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence adheres to the notion 
that matters that are no longer completely secret can no longer be private. As 
William Stuntz observes, according to the Court, Fourth Amendment pri-
vacy “flows out of the interest in keeping secrets, not out of the interest in 
being free from unreasonable police coercion or from other kinds of  
dignitary harms that search targets may suffer.”95 In a series of cases, the 
Court has held there can be no “reasonable expectation of privacy” in 
things exposed to the public, even if it is highly unlikely that anybody will 
see or discover them. As the Court observed in Katz:  “What a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”96 For example, in California v. 
Greenwood,97 the Court held there is no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in garbage because it is knowingly exposed to the public:  “It is common 
knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street 
are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other 
members of the public.”98 Similarly, in Florida v. Riley,99 the Court held 
that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to surveillance of a person’s 
                                                                                                                          
 93. See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding 
that agency’s request for medical records to investigate work-related health hazards justified a minimal 
intrusion into the privacy of employees’ medical records; agency had to notify the workers and give 
them a chance to opt out); Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376 (D.N.J. 1990) (finding 
violation of constitutional right to privacy by police disclosing that person had AIDS); Woods v. White, 
689 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (finding that a prisoner has a constitutional right to privacy in 
his medical records); Carter v. Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 667 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D. Iowa 1987) (finding that 
hospital’s allowing chaplains access to medical records violated constitutional privacy). 
 94. Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding that a community notification 
law for sex offenders (known as Megan’s Law) does not violate constitutional privacy because 
government’s interest in preventing sex offenses is compelling); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 
1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that Washington State’s version of Megan’s Law does not violate 
constitutional privacy because the “information collected and disseminated by the Washington statute is 
already fully available to the public and is not constitutionally protected”); Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 
176, 179 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that there is no constitutional privacy right in criminal records 
because “arrest and conviction information are matters of public record”); Scheetz v. The Morning 
Call, Inc., 946 F.2d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding no right to privacy for disclosure of information in 
police reports).  
 95. William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 
1016, 1022 (1995). 
 96. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 97. 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
 98. Id. at 40. 
 99. 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
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property from an aircraft flying in navigable airspace because the surveil-
lance was conducted from a public vantage point.100 
 A number of theorists have claimed that understanding privacy as se-
crecy conceptualizes privacy too narrowly. Legal theorist Edward 
Bloustein as well as anthropologist Arnold Simmel have criticized the the-
ory of privacy as secrecy as failing to recognize group privacy.101 By equat-
ing privacy with secrecy, this formulation fails to recognize that 
individuals want to keep things private from some people but not others. 
Criticizing a boss to a coworker does not mean that the employee desires 
that her boss know her comments. Being a member of an organization, es-
pecially an unpopular one, is also regarded by many as a private matter. 
Further, the conception of privacy as secrecy maintained by many courts 
views secrecy as tantamount to total secrecy rather than selective secrecy. 
As sociologist Edward Shils notes, contrary to privacy as secrecy, the indi-
vidual does not intend an act of disclosure to be limitless.102 “Meaningful 
discussion of privacy,” legal scholar Kenneth Karst states, “requires the 
recognition that ordinarily we deal not with an interest in total  
nondisclosure but with an interest in selective disclosure.”103 
 Some theorists attempt to avoid these problems by focusing on selec-
tive secrecy. For example, Amitai Etzioni defines privacy as “the realm in 
which an actor (either a person or a group, such as a couple) can  
legitimately act without disclosure and accountability to others.”104 Never-
theless, even under the selective secrecy conception, the harm caused by an 
invasion of privacy is understood as the disclosure of previously concealed 
information. Privacy, however, involves more than avoiding disclosure; it 
also involves the individual’s ability to ensure that personal information is 
used for the purposes she desires.105 According to philosopher Judith  
Wagner DeCew, secrecy is certainly not coextensive with privacy; secret 
                                                                                                                          
 100. See id. at 450-51; see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding that Fourth 
Amendment did not apply to surveillance of property from airplane flying at 1000 feet); Dow Chem. 
Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (holding that Fourth Amendment did not apply to aerial 
surveillance of property with high-tech camera which could enlarge objects so that objects half an inch 
in diameter could be seen).  
 101. See, e.g., Arnold Simmel, Privacy Is Not an Isolated Freedom, in Nomos XIII, supra note 71, 
at 71, 81. Simmel observed: 
We become what we are not only by establishing boundaries around ourselves but also by a 
periodic opening of these boundaries to nourishment, to learning, and to intimacy. But the 
opening of a boundary of the self may require a boundary farther out, a boundary around the 
group to which we are opening ourselves. 
Id. For a theoretical discussion of group privacy, see Edward J. Bloustein, Individual and Group 
Privacy 123-86 (1978).  
 102. See Shils, supra note 72, at 305. 
 103. Kenneth L. Karst, “The Files”:  Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility of 
Stored Personal Data, 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 342, 344 (1966). 
 104. Amitai Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy 196 (1999). 
 105. See Solove, supra note 83, at 1439. 
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information is often not private (for example, secret military plans) and 
private matters are not always secret (for example, one’s debts).106 
 We often expect privacy even when in public. Not all activities we 
deem as private occur behind the curtain. The books we read, the products 
we buy, the people we associate with—these are often not viewed as se-
crets, but we nonetheless view them as private matters. As philosopher 
Julie Inness observes, privacy as secrecy omits the element of con-
trol:  “[P]rivacy might not necessarily be opposed to publicity; its function 
might be to provide the individual with control over certain aspects of her 
life.”107 This sentiment was also recognized by Stanley Benn, who ob-
served that privacy is not that one’s private affairs “are kept out of sight or 
from the knowledge of others that makes them private. Rather, [one’s  
private affairs] are matters that it would be inappropriate for others to try to 
find out about, much less report on, without one’s consent.”108 
 In elaborating upon the privacy exemption of the Freedom of  
Information Act (“FOIA”), the Supreme Court appeared to understand the 
imperfections of understanding privacy as secrecy. In United States  
Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,109 
the Court held that the release of FBI rap sheets (containing personal in-
formation from law enforcement records about millions of people) was an 
invasion of privacy within the privacy exemption of FOIA. Although the 
information in the rap sheet had previously been publicly disclosed, the 
Court held that “there are few facts that are not at one time or another  
divulged to another,” and that there was an important distinction “between 
scattered disclosure of the bits of information contained in a rap sheet and 
revelation of the rap sheet as a whole.”110 In other words, the Court recog-
nized that the accessibility of information, not the mere secrecy of it, was 
important to protecting privacy. However, the Court has failed to recognize 
this insight in other contexts.  
 Therefore, while most theorists would recognize the disclosure of cer-
tain secrets to be a violation of privacy, many commonly recognized pri-
vacy invasions do not involve the loss of secrecy. Secrecy as the common 
denominator of privacy makes the conception of privacy too narrow.  
4. Control Over Personal Information 
 One of the most predominant theories of privacy is that of control 
over personal information. According to Alan Westin:  “Privacy is the 
                                                                                                                          
 106. Judith Wagner DeCew, In Pursuit of Privacy:  Law, Ethics, and the Rise of 
Technology 48 (1997). 
 107. Inness, supra note 3, at 6. 
 108. Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in Nomos XIII, supra note 71, at 
2. 
 109. 489 U.S. 749 (1989). 
 110. Id. at 763-64. 
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claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves 
when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to 
others.”111 Numerous other scholars have articulated similar theories.112 
Arthur Miller declares that “the basic attribute of an effective right of  
privacy is the individual’s ability to control the circulation of information 
relating to him.”113 According to Charles Fried, “Privacy is not simply an 
absence of information about us in the minds of others; rather it is the  
control we have over information about ourselves.”114 President Clinton’s 
Information Infrastructure Task Force has defined privacy as “an  
individual’s claim to control the terms under which personal information—
information identifiable to the individual—is acquired, disclosed, and 
used.”115 The Supreme Court has even stated that privacy is “control over 
information concerning his or her person.”116  
 The control-over-information can be viewed as a subset of the limited 
access conception. The theory’s focus on information, however, makes it 
too narrow a conception, for it excludes those aspects of privacy that are 
not informational, such as the right to make certain fundamental decisions 
about one’s body, reproduction, or rearing of one’s children.  
                                                                                                                          
 111. Westin, supra note 4, at 7. 
 112. See, e.g., Breckenridge, supra note 66, at 1 (noting that privacy is “the individual’s right to 
control dissemination of information about himself”); Executive Office of the President, Office 
of Science and Technology, Privacy and Behavioral Research 2 (Washington, D.C., G.P.O. 
1967) (“The right to privacy is the right of the individual to decide for himself how much he will share 
with others his thoughts, his feelings, and the facts of his personal life.”); Randall P. Benzanson, The 
Right to Privacy Revisited:  Privacy, News, and Social Change, 1890-1990, 80 Calif. L. Rev. 1133, 
1135 (1992) (“I will advance a concept of privacy based on the individual’s control of information.”); 
Oscar M. Ruebhausen & Orville G. Brim, Jr., Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 Colum. L Rev. 
1184, 1189 (1965) (“The essence of privacy is no more, and certainly no less, than the freedom of the 
individual to pick and choose for himself the time and circumstances under which, and most 
importantly, the extent to which, his attitudes, beliefs, behavior and opinions are to be shared with or 
withheld from others.”). Anne Wells Branscomb, in a recently published book, focuses almost 
exclusively on the importance of control over information for privacy. See Anne Wells Branscomb, 
Who Owns Information?:  From Privacy to Public Access (1994). Warren and Brandeis also 
appear at one point to suggest a control-over-information conception of privacy:   
The common law secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what 
extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others. . . . [E]ven if 
he has chosen to give them expression, he generally retains the power to fix the limits of the 
publicity which shall be given them. 
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 43, at 198; see also Ian Goldberg et al., Trust, Ethics, and Privacy, 81 
B.U. L. Rev. 407, 418 (2001) (“We build our own definition of privacy on what we consider the most 
elegant definition, ‘informational self-determination,’ which refers to a person’s ability to control the 
flow of his own personal information.”).  
 113. Miller, supra note 2, at 25. 
 114. Fried, supra note 22, at 482-83. 
 115. President Clinton’s Information Infrastructure Task Force (IITF):  Principles for 
Providing and Using Personal Information 5 (1995). 
 116. United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 
763 (1989). 
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 Additionally, the theory is too vague because proponents of the theory 
often fail to define the types of information over which individuals should 
have control. Ferdinand Schoeman, for example, observes:   
One difficulty with regarding privacy as a claim or entitlement to 
determine what information about oneself is to be available to  
others is that it begs the question about the moral status of privacy. 
It presumes privacy is something to be protected at the discretion 
of the individual to whom the information relates.117  
In other words, the privacy as control-over-information theory at most says 
that we protect as private all information over which individuals want to 
retain control. Privacy, however, is not simply a matter of individual pre-
rogative; it is also an issue of what society deems appropriate to protect. 
 Some theorists attempt to define the scope of what constitutes per-
sonal information over which individuals should exercise control, but their 
attempts run into significant difficulties. For example, legal scholar  
Richard Parker’s theory defines the scope of personal information ex-
tremely broadly:  “Privacy is control over when and by whom the various 
parts of us can be sensed by others.”118 “Control over who can see us, hear 
us, touch us, smell us, and taste us, in sum, control over who can sense us, 
is the core of privacy.”119 Parker’s definition would make most interper-
sonal contact in society a privacy invasion because it brings unwanted ac-
cess to the self. Yet, we are frequently seen and heard by others without 
perceiving it as even the slightest invasion of privacy. 
 Charles Fried links his definition of the scope of personal information 
to the value of privacy. He defines privacy as “control over knowledge 
about oneself”120 that is necessary to protect “fundamental relations” of 
“respect, love, friendship and trust.”121 His theory speaks about the value of 
privacy (promoting respect, love, friendship, and trust) and presumably, 
would define the scope of information as “intimate” information (informa-
tion necessary to form and foster relationships involving respect, love, 
friendship, and trust). However, looking at only intimate information ex-
cludes important information such as financial records.  
 Finally, one could limit the scope of personal information to that 
which relates to the individual. Richard Murphy defines the scope of per-
sonal information as consisting of “any data about an individual that is 
identifiable to that individual.”122 Murphy’s definition is too broad because 
there is a significant amount of information identifiable to us that we do 
                                                                                                                          
 117. Schoeman, supra note 63, at 3. 
 118. Parker, supra note 22, at 281. 
 119. Id. at 280. 
 120. Fried, supra note 22, at 483. 
 121. Id. at 477.  
 122. Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information:  An Economic Defense of 
Privacy, 84 Geo. L.J. 2381, 2383 (1996). 
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not deem as private. For example, the fact that a person is a well-known 
politician is identifiable to her, but is not private. Murphy’s definition thus 
provides no reasonable limitation in scope. 
 In addition to failing to adequately define the scope of information, 
the conceptions of privacy as control over information fail to define what is 
meant by “control” over information. Theorists provide little elaboration as 
to what control really entails, and it is often understood too narrowly or too 
broadly. Frequently, control is understood as a form of ownership in in-
formation. For example, Westin concludes that “personal information, 
thought of as the right of decision over one’s private personality, should be 
defined as a property right.”123 This notion is partially embodied in the tort 
of commercial appropriation, which protects people against others’ using 
their image or likeness for commercial gain.124 
 The notion that individuals have a property right in information about 
themselves can be traced to John Locke, who asserted that individuals have 
property rights in their person and the fruits of their labor. According to 
Locke, privacy flows naturally from selfhood:  “[E]very man has a  
property in his own person.”125 From this principle, Locke deduced that 
property extends to the products of one’s labor:  “Whatsoever then he  
removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath 
mixed his labor with, and joined it to something that is his own, and 
thereby makes it his property.”126  
 Locke’s conception of property as the fruit of labor and as an exten-
sion of self have formed the backbone of intellectual property law, which, 
as James Boyle has observed, has developed around the notion of the  
“romantic author,” the individual who mixes her unique personality with 
ideas, who most displays originality and novelty in her creations.127 Unlike 
physical property, intellectual property protects the expression of ideas, 
“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of  
expression.”128 The “romantic author” notion of intellectual property 
embodies Locke’s idea that one gains a property right in something when it 
emanates from one’s self.  
 Personal information as property is justified by viewing it as an exten-
sion of personality. As the authors of our own lives, we generate informa-
tion as we develop our personalities. The growth of individualism spawned 
                                                                                                                          
 123. Westin, supra note 4, at 324. 
 124. According to the Restatement of Torts:  “One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the 
name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.” 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §652C (1977). 
 125. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government § 27, at 19 (1980) (1690).  
 126. Id.  
 127. See James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens:  Law and the Construction of 
the Information Society 54 (1996). 
 128. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).  
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the “belief that one’s actions and their history ‘belonged’ to the self which 
generated them and were to be shared only with those with whom one 
wished to share them.”129 “One’s self—for other people—is one’s  
expression of one’s self,” observes Madame Merle in Henry James’s  
Portrait of a Lady, “and one’s house, one’s furniture, one’s garments, the 
books one reads, the company one keeps—these things are all  
expressive.”130 
 Given the unique nature of information, the extension of these con-
cepts to personal information does not come without some difficulties. In-
formation can be easily transmitted, and once known by others, cannot be 
eradicated from their minds. Unlike physical objects, information can be 
possessed simultaneously within the minds of millions. This is why intel-
lectual property law protects particular tangible expressions of ideas rather 
than the underlying ideas themselves. The complexity of personal informa-
tion is that it is both an expression of the self as well as a set of facts, a his-
torical record of one’s behavior. 
 Further, there are problems with viewing personal information as 
equivalent to any other commodity. Personal information is often formed 
in relationships with others, with all parties to that relationship having 
some claim to that information. For example, individuals are not the lone 
creators of their web-browsing information, for most of that information is 
created from the interaction between the user and websites.131 Often, the 
market value of information is not created exclusively by the labor of the 
individual to whom it relates but in part by the third party that compiles the 
information.132 For example, the value of personal information for advertis-
ers and marketers emerges in part from their consolidation and categoriza-
tion of that information.  
 An example of the difficulty in assigning ownership to information is 
illustrated by Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.133 This case involved  
Nicholas Lemann’s highly praised book about the social and political his-
tory of African Americans who migrated from the South to northern cities. 
The book chronicled the life of Ruby Lee Daniels, who suffered greatly 
from her former husband Luther Haynes’s alcoholism, selfishness, and ir-
responsible conduct. Haynes sued the author and the publisher under the 
public disclosure of private facts tort, claiming that he had long since 
turned his life around and that the disclosure of his past destroyed the new 
life he had worked so hard to construct. Judge Posner, writing for the 
panel, concluded that there could be no liability for invasion of privacy 
                                                                                                                          
 129. Shils, supra note 72, at 290. 
 130. HENRY JAMES, PORTRAIT OF A LADY 253 (Geoffrey Moore ed., Penguin Books 1986) (1881).  
 131. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1193, 1202, 
1246 (1998). 
 132. Miller, supra note 2, at 213. 
 133. 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.). 
1114  CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1087 
 
because “[a] person does not have a legally protected right to a reputation 
based on the concealment of the truth”134 and because the book narrated “a 
story not only of legitimate but of transcendent public interest.”135  
 Although it did not hinge on the shared nature of the information, this 
case illustrates that personal information rarely belongs to just one individ-
ual; it is often formed in relationships with others. Ruby Daniels’s story 
was deeply interwoven with Haynes’s story. Daniels had a right to speak 
about her own past, to have her story told. This was her life story, not just 
Luther Haynes’s. In sum, understanding control as ownership presents dif-
ficulties in grappling with the unique shared nature of much private infor-
mation. A claim of privacy is not the same as a claim of ownership.  
 Not only does defining control prove difficult, control over informa-
tion is too broad a conception. Gerety claims that Westin’s definition “on 
its face includes all control over all information about oneself, one’s group, 
one’s institutions. Surely privacy should come, in law as in life, to much 
less than this.”136 According to Inness, not all personal information is pri-
vate; she contends that “it is the intimacy of this information that identifies 
a loss of privacy.”137 Thus one possibility is that the control-over-
information conception could be limited in scope by including only inti-
mate information. 
 Even if narrowed to include only intimate information, however, the 
conception is still too broad. According to DeCew, we often lose control 
over information in ways that do not involve an invasion of our privacy.138 
To illustrate this point, Daniel Farber invokes the example of the flasher. A 
flasher is controlling the visual access to his body by allowing it, yet  
preventing flashing is not a violation of the flasher’s privacy; rather, flash-
ing is seen as a violation of the privacy of others.139  
 David O’Brien also criticizes the conception of privacy as the control 
of information for being too narrow.140 Many privacy interests involve an 
individual’s “freedom to engage in private activities” rather than the dis-
closure or nondisclosure of information.141 O’Brien correctly recognizes 
that privacy is invaded not just by intrusions into information but also by 
nuisances such as noises, smells, and other noxious disruptions of one’s 
peace of mind.142 As DeCew points out, the conception of privacy as con-
trol over information is too narrow because privacy is not reducible to  
                                                                                                                          
 134. Id. at 1228. 
 135. Id. at 1233. 
 136. Gerety, supra note 6, at 262-63. 
 137. Inness, supra note 3, at 58. 
 138. DeCew, supra note 106, at 53. 
 139. Daniel A. Farber, Book Review:  Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation by Julie C. Inness, 10 
Const. Comment. 510, 514-15 (1993). 
 140. O’Brien, supra note 22, at 13. 
 141. Id. at 14. 
 142. Id. 
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personal information.143 Privacy, contends DeCew, can be invaded even if 
nobody else knows something new about a person, such as by being forced 
to hear propaganda, by being manipulated by subliminal advertisements, or 
by being disrupted by a nuisance that thwarts one’s ability to think or 
read.144 In other words, the theory of privacy as control over information 
excludes many aspects of life that we commonly assume to be private. 
Anita Allen similarly critiques the control-over-information conception for 
omitting issues such as abortion and sexual freedom.145 
 Additionally, some theorists critique the control-over-personal-
information conception as being too narrow because it focuses too heavily 
on individual choice. Paul Schwartz argues that the conception of informa-
tion control wrongly assumes that individuals have the autonomy to exer-
cise control over their personal data in all situations, an assumption that 
fails to recognize “that individual self-determination is itself shaped by the  
processing of personal data.”146 Schwartz also questions the assumption 
that individuals are able to exercise meaningful choices with regard to their 
information, given disparities in knowledge and power when bargaining 
over the transfer of their information.147 The implication is that privacy in-
volves not only individual control, but also the social regulation of infor-
mation.148 In other words, privacy is an aspect of social structure, an 
architecture of information regulation, not just a matter for the exercise of 
individual control.  
 To summarize, conceptualizing privacy as control over personal in-
formation can be too vague, too broad, or too narrow. Conceptions of in-
formation control are too vague when they fail to define what types of 
information over which individuals should have control. When theorists 
attempt to define what constitutes “personal information,” the conceptions 
become overly limited or expansive. Further, when theorists attempt to de-
fine what “control” entails, they often define it as a form of ownership, 
making the conception falter in a number of respects. Finally, conceptions 
of information control are too narrow because they reduce privacy to in-
formational concerns, omit decisional freedom from the realm of privacy, 
and focus too exclusively on individual choice. 
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5. Personhood 
 Another theory of privacy views it as a form of protecting person-
hood. Building upon Warren and Brandeis’s notion of “inviolate  
personality,” Paul Freund coined the term “personhood” to refer to “those 
attributes of an individual which are irreducible in his selfhood.”149  
 The theory of privacy as personhood differs from the theories dis-
cussed earlier because it is constructed around a normative end of privacy, 
namely the protection of the integrity of the personality. This theory is not 
independent of the other theories, and it often is used in conjunction with 
the other theories to explain why privacy is important, what aspects of the 
self should be limited, or what information we should have control over.  
a. Individuality, Dignity, and Autonomy 
 What is personhood? What aspects of the self does privacy protect? 
According to Edward Bloustein, privacy protects individuality.150 Privacy 
is a unified and coherent concept protecting against conduct that is  
“demeaning to individuality,”151 “an affront to personal dignity,”152 or an 
“assault on human personality.”153 Jeffrey Reiman also recognizes a  
personhood component to privacy:  “The right to privacy . . . protects the  
individual’s interest in becoming, being, and remaining a person.”154 
 Philosopher Stanley Benn also develops a personhood conception of 
privacy, noting that privacy amounts to respect for individuals as choos-
ers:  “[R]espect for someone as a person, as a chooser, implie[s] respect for 
him as one engaged on a kind of self-creative enterprise, which could be 
disrupted, distorted, or frustrated even by so limited an intrusion as  
watching.”155 Drawing from Jean Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, 
Benn explains that being “an object of scrutiny, as the focus of another’s 
attention, brings one to a new consciousness of oneself, as something seen 
through another’s eyes.”156 The observed “becomes aware of himself as an 
object, knowable, having a determinate character.”157 According to Benn, 
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the result is that the observed person “is fixed as something—with limited 
probabilities rather than infinite, indeterminate possibilities.”158 In other 
words, Benn contends that surveillance restricts an individual’s range of 
choices and thus limits her freedom. Accordingly, privacy is about respect 
for personhood, with personhood defined in terms of the individual’s ca-
pacity to choose. 
 The Supreme Court has espoused a personhood theory of privacy in 
its substantive due process decisions such as Griswold v. Connecticut,159 
Eisenstadt v. Baird,160 Roe v. Wade,161 and others. As early as 1891, the 
Court articulated this conception in Union Pacific Railway Co. v.  
Botsford.162 There, in holding that a court could not compel a plaintiff in a 
civil action to submit to a surgical examination, the Court declared the 
sanctity of “the right of every individual to the possession and control of 
his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by 
clear and unquestionable authority of law.”163 Later cases characterized 
privacy as an “interest in independence in making certain kinds of  
important decisions.”164 Specifically, these cases involved decisions relat-
ing to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child 
rearing.165 In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,166 the Supreme Court provided 
its most elaborate explanation of what the “privacy” protected by the con-
stitutional right to privacy encompasses:   
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a 
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity 
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the  
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define 
the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of 
the State.167 
In other words, the Court has conceptualized the protection of privacy as 
the state’s noninterference in certain decisions that are essential to defining 
personhood.  
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 Some critics complain that personhood theories, and the Court’s pri-
vacy cases, are really about liberty and autonomy, not about privacy. In 
Democracy’s Discontent, Michael Sandel argues that the Court’s privacy 
cases conflate privacy and autonomy.168 Louis Henkin contends that  
Griswold, Roe, and Baird establish “not a right to freedom from official 
intrusion, but to freedom from official regulation.”169 But as DeCew count-
ers, there is an “intuitive notion of privacy invoked in the constitutional 
privacy cases.”170 She argues that there is no need to view privacy as totally 
exclusive from autonomy and liberty, for conceptions can overlap.171 
 Theories of privacy as personhood, however, fail to elucidate what 
privacy is because the theories often do not articulate an adequate defini-
tion of personhood. Freund’s notion of attributes irreducible in one’s self-
hood is far too vague, and merely substitutes “selfhood” for “personhood.” 
Bloustein’s discussion of personhood as “individuality” fails to define the 
scope or nature of individuality. Other commentators define personhood as 
a type of autonomy,172 but as Jed Rubenfeld observes, “to call an individual 
‘autonomous’ is simply another way of saying that he is morally free, and 
to say that the right to privacy protects freedom adds little to our  
understanding of the doctrine.”173  
 Personhood theories are also too broad. Our personalities are not 
purely private; indeed, there is much that is unique to the self that we  
readily display and express in public. An artistic work is often an expres-
sion of the deepest recesses of an artist’s existence; yet art is rarely exclu-
sively a private affair. Gavison, for example, criticizes Bloustein’s dignity 
conception because “there are ways to offend dignity and personality that 
have nothing to do with privacy.”174 She elaborates:  “Having to beg or sell 
one’s body in order to survive are serious affronts to dignity, but do not 
appear to involve loss of privacy.”175  
 Further, theories of privacy as personhood tell us why we value pri-
vacy (to protect individuality, dignity, and autonomy), but their usual focus 
on limiting state intervention in our decisions often gives too little attention 
to the private sector. Merely restricting state interference is not always suf-
ficient to protect privacy. Therefore, beyond an account of where the state 
ought to leave individuals alone, personhood theories frequently fail to ex-
plain how personhood is to be protected. This is essentially what Gross and 
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O’Brien are claiming when they criticize Bloustein for telling us only why 
we value privacy rather than what privacy is.176  
b. Antitotalitarianism 
 In his influential article, The Right of Privacy, Jed Rubenfeld has pro-
vided a sophisticated account of the problems of the personhood theory of 
privacy.177 According to Rubenfeld, “[t]he personhood thesis is this:  where 
our identity or self-definition is at stake, there the state may not  
interfere.”178 As Rubenfeld correctly observes, the law cannot protect all 
forms of self-definition, for some forms conflict with others, and very few 
meaningful acts of self-definition have no effects on others.179 “Personhood 
cannot exclude ‘intolerant’ identities without abandoning its  
value-neutrality as between identities.”180 This fact leads Rubenfeld to con-
clude that personhood’s “final defense” rests on a view of what is funda-
mentally important to individual identity.181 
 However, Rubenfeld argues, “[b]y conceiving of the conduct that it 
purports to protect as ‘essential to the individual’s identity,’ personhood 
inadvertently reintroduces into privacy analysis the very premise of the 
invidious uses of state power it seeks to overcome.”182 When the state en-
deavors to protect personhood, it must adopt and enforce its own  
conception of individual identity, impinging upon the freedom of individu-
als to define what is central to their identities for themselves.  
 Rubenfeld offers an alternative conception, defining the right to pri-
vacy as “the fundamental freedom not to have one’s life too totally  
determined by a progressively more normalizing state.”183 Rubenfeld 
claims that privacy protects against a “creeping totalitarianism, an unarmed 
occupation of individuals’ lives.”184 Privacy “is to be invoked only where 
the government threatens to take over or occupy our lives—to exert its 
power in some way over the totality of our lives.”185 As Rubenfeld elabo-
rates, “[t]he anti-totalitarian right to privacy . . . prevents the state from 
imposing on individuals a defined identity.”186 
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 Although Rubenfeld’s critique of the personhood conception is cer-
tainly warranted, he fails in his attempt to abandon a personhood concep-
tion. If privacy concerns only those exercises of state power that threaten 
the “totality of our lives,” then it is difficult to conceive of anything that 
would be protected. Indeed, as Rubenfeld himself notes, infringements on 
privacy are “creeping,” that is, they often occur in small encroachments 
into our private lives. As I explain in depth in another article, privacy is 
often destroyed by an aggregation of these minor encroachments, not al-
ways by a large exercise of state power.187  
 Rubenfeld’s critique of personhood forbids him to sketch any concep-
tion of identity that the law should protect, for to do so would be to seize 
from individuals their right to define themselves. By abandoning any at-
tempt to define a conception of identity, Rubenfeld’s conception of privacy 
collapses into a vague right to be let alone. To the extent it tells us anything 
meaningful about which exercises of state power must be curtailed, it must 
depend upon an affirmative conception of personhood. For example, 
Rubenfeld states:  “[C]hildbearing, marriage, and the assumption of a  
specific sexual identity are undertakings that go on for years, define roles, 
direct activities, operate on or even create intense emotional relations, 
enlist the body, inform values, and in sum substantially shape the totality 
of a person’s daily life and consciousness.”188 Rubenfeld defines these as-
pects of life as at the heart of identity because of their pervasiveness and 
longevity. Thus, he is creating a conception of personhood that focuses on 
pervasiveness and longevity as the defining factors.  
 Rubenfeld is correct that laws purporting to be protective of person-
hood can impose a view of what aspects of life are essential to the individ-
ual and hence supplant the individual’s own self-definition. However, 
Rubenfeld is too quick to condemn as “invidious” all state power that 
shapes identities.189 Not all such exercises of state power are pernicious. In 
fact, privacy is both a positive and negative right; it is not just a freedom 
from the state, but a duty of the state to protect certain matters via property 
rights, tort law, criminal law, and other legal devices. Without protection 
against rape, assault, trespass, collection of personal information, and so 
on, we would have little privacy and scant space or security to engage in 
self-definition. To preserve people’s ability to engage in self-definition, the 
state must actively intervene to curtail the power of customs and norms 
that constrain freedom. Therefore, although Rubenfeld is correct that the 
state cannot be neutral when it becomes involved in one’s self-definition, 
he errs in assuming that he can develop his theory of antitotalitarianism 
without an account of personhood.  
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6. Intimacy 
 An increasingly popular theory understands privacy as a form of inti-
macy. This theory appropriately recognizes that privacy is not just essential 
to individual self-creation, but also to human relationships. As Daniel  
Farber correctly notes, one virtue of privacy as intimacy is that it  
“expand[s] moral personhood beyond simple rational autonomy.”190 The 
theory views privacy as consisting of some form of limited access or con-
trol, and it locates the value of privacy in the development of personal rela-
tionships.  
 We form relationships with differing degrees of intimacy and self-
revelation, and we value privacy so that we can maintain the desired levels 
of intimacy for each of our varied relationships. For example, political sci-
entist Robert Gerstein claims that “intimate relationships simply could not 
exist if we did not continue to insist on privacy for them.”191 As Jeffrey 
Rosen observes:  “In order to flourish, the intimate relationships on which 
true knowledge of another person depends need space as well as 
time:  sanctuaries from the gaze of the crowd in which slow mutual  
self-disclosure is possible.”192 By focusing on the relationship-oriented 
value of privacy, the theory of privacy as intimacy attempts to define what 
aspects of life we should be able to restrict access to, or what information 
we should be able to control or keep secret. 
 In Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation, philosopher Julie Inness advances 
an intimacy conception of privacy:   
[T]he content of privacy cannot be captured if we focus exclusively 
on either information, access, or intimate decisions because privacy 
involves all three areas. . . . I suggest that these apparently  
disparate areas are linked by the common denominator of  
intimacy—privacy’s content covers intimate information, access, 
and decisions.”193  
In contrast to many proponents of privacy as intimacy, Inness recognizes 
the need to define intimacy. She notes that there are two ways to do so:  by 
looking at behavior or by looking at motivations. She rejects an empirical 
examination of particular instances of human behavior as inadequate to 
define intimacy. This is because these behaviors “lack an intimate essence” 
and a theory that looks to behaviors could not account for the fact that in-
timacy “is not static across time or culture.”194 According to Inness, 
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“[I]ntimacy stems from something prior to behavior.”195 It is the motives of 
an individual that matter. Intimate matters or acts draw “their value and 
meaning from the agent’s love, care, or liking.”196 This, then, she claims, 
defines the scope of intimacy. Privacy is “the state of the agent having  
control over decisions concerning matters that draw their meaning and 
value from the agent’s love, caring, or liking. These decisions cover 
choices on the agent’s part about access to herself, the dissemination of 
information about herself, and her actions.”197  
 Charles Fried, who understands privacy as control over information, 
advances an intimacy conception to locate the value of privacy and circum-
scribe the scope of information over which we should have control. For 
Fried, “[i]ntimacy is the sharing of information about one’s actions, beliefs 
or emotions which one does not share with all, and which one has the right 
not to share with anyone. By conferring this right, privacy creates the 
moral capital which we spend in friendship and love.”198 Similarly, James 
Rachels contends that privacy is valuable because “there is a close  
connection between our ability to control who has access to us and to  
information about us, and our ability to create and maintain different sorts 
of social relationships with different people.”199 
 How is “intimate” information to be defined? For Fried and Rachels, 
intimate information is that which individuals want to reveal only to a few 
other people. Philosopher Jeff Reiman critiques Fried and Rachels for 
claiming that intimate information is merely scarce information that  
individuals want to keep away from others.200 He argues that Fried and 
Rachels’s view of intimacy “overlooks the fact that what constitutes inti-
macy is not merely the sharing of otherwise withheld information, but the 
context of caring which makes the sharing of personal information  
significant.”201 The ability to love and to care for others transcends the 
mere sharing of secrets. For example, Reiman states that “[o]ne ordinarily 
reveals information to one’s psychoanalyst that one might hesitate to reveal 
to a friend or lover. That hardly means one has an intimate relationship 
with the analyst.”202 “What is missing,” Reiman declares, “is that particular 
kind of caring that makes a relationship not just personal but intimate.”203 
To illustrate his point, Reiman points out that merely providing special  
                                                                                                                          
 195. Id. at 77.  
 196. Id. at 78.  
 197. Id. at 91.  
 198. Charles Fried, An Anatomy of Values:  Problems of Personal and Social Choice 
142 (1970). 
 199. James Rachels, Why Privacy is Important, in Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy, supra 
note 6, at 290, 292. 
 200. Reiman, supra note 154, at 304-05. 
 201. Id. at 305.  
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
2002] CONCEPTUALIZING PRIVACY 1123 
 
access to our bodies does not define sexual intimacy. If this were the case, 
a doctor’s examination of our genitals would be intimate.204 Thus Reiman 
criticizes Fried and Rachels for focusing too heavily on the notion of con-
trol and limited access rather than on the attributes of intimate relation-
ships.  
 Tom Gerety also bases his formulation of privacy on intimacy. Begin-
ning with the criticism that existing theories of privacy are far too broad 
because they lack any meaningful limitation in scope, he goes on to claim 
that “[i]ntimacy is the chief restricting concept in the definition of  
privacy.”205 Intimacy is “the consciousness of the mind in its access to its 
own and other bodies and minds, insofar, at least, as these are generally or 
specifically secluded from the access of the uninvited.”206 In other words, 
his definition of intimacy is a form of limited access to the self. However, 
this definition fails for the same reasons the limited-access conceptions 
fail:  it does not adequately provide us with a scope and content to privacy. 
Gerety attempts to develop his definition of intimacy a bit further, discuss-
ing it later in his essay in terms of its expressiveness of individual identity 
and autonomy. He thus claims that abortion is a private decision because it 
is “an intimate one, expressive of both [a woman’s] identity and her  
autonomy.”207  
 But Gerety’s intimacy theory of privacy, like the theories he critiques, 
is too broad. Gerety attempts to limit privacy with the terms “identity” and 
“autonomy,” but these are very broad terms that could apply to almost 
every action or decision an individual undertakes. While Gerety complains 
about overbroad conceptions of privacy that have no meaningful limitation, 
his conception suffers from the same defect. Without limitations in scope, 
the word “intimacy” is merely a different word for “privacy,” and is cer-
tainly not sufficient as a way to determine which matters are private.  
 On the other hand, privacy-as-intimacy theories are too narrow be-
cause they focus too exclusively on interpersonal relationships and the par-
ticular feelings engendered by them. Although trust, love, and intimacy are 
facilitated by privacy, these are not the sole ends of privacy. As DeCew 
points out, information about our finances is private yet not intimate.208 
Trust, love, and caring are not broad enough to comprise a conception of 
privacy; although privacy helps us achieve these ends, these ends do not 
comprise a complete conception of privacy. As Farber notes, there are 
many sexual relationships devoid of love, liking, or caring as there are 
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many acts expressive of love, liking, or caring (such as buying gifts) that 
are not considered intimate.209 
 Furthermore, privacy’s value does not lie exclusively in the develop-
ment of intimate human relationships. Intimacy captures the dimension of 
the private life that consists of close relationships with others; but it does 
not capture the dimension of private life that is devoted to the self alone. 
As Weinstein observes:   
[T]here is a wide range of instances where to speak of something as 
private is not to imply intimacy. Individuals not intimately related 
may nevertheless assert that their relation or activity is a private 
one in the sense that it is not the proper concern of the community 
or some institution, such as the state, a church, or a business 
firm.210 
For example, as political scientist Priscilla Regan notes, computer data-
bases pose a significant threat to privacy but “do not primarily  
affect . . . relationships of friendship, love, and trust. Instead, these threats 
come from private and governmental organizations—the police, welfare 
agencies, credit agencies, banks, and employers.”211  
 In sum, privacy-as-intimacy conceptions can be too broad if they do 
not adequately define the scope of “intimacy.” Most often, however, such 
conceptions are too narrow because they exclude many matters that do not 
involve loving and caring relationships.  
C. Toward a New Approach to Conceptualizing Privacy 
 Although each of the conceptions of privacy described above elabo-
rates upon certain dimensions of privacy and contains countless insights, 
settling upon any one of the conceptions results in either a reductive or an 
overly broad account of privacy. Because of these difficulties, some theo-
rists, referred to as “reductionists,”212 claim that the impoverishment of the 
discourse is symptomatic of the fact that privacy should not be understood 
as a distinct conception. They argue that privacy is reducible to other con-
ceptions and rights. The most prominent proponent of this view is Judith 
Thomson, who claims that the right to privacy is not a distinct right, but is 
“overlapped by other rights.”213 According to Thomson, the right to privacy 
consists of “the right to not be looked at and the right to not be listened 
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to”214—rights which she claims “are analogous to rights we have over our 
property.”215  
  However, reductionists assume without sufficient justification that 
privacy derives from other more primary conceptions rather than vice 
versa.216 They attempt to carve up the conceptual landscape as colonists 
divide conquered territory on a map. Although privacy overlaps with other 
conceptions, it does seem to reveal certain dimensions of experience that 
are not displayed in the same way by other conceptions. Wittgenstein 
speaks of conceptions as ways of seeing things,217 and a difference in per-
spective and focus is not irrelevant.  
 Other scholars also recognize that privacy cannot be consolidated into 
a single conception, and instead they cluster together certain of the concep-
tions.218 For example, Jerry Kang defines privacy as a union of three over-
lapping clusters of ideas:  (1)  physical space—“the extent to which an 
individual’s territorial solitude is shielded from invasion by unwanted  
objects or signals”;  (2)  choice—“an individual’s ability to make certain 
significant decisions without interference”;  (3)  flow of personal informa-
tion—“an individual’s control over the processing—i.e., the acquisition, 
disclosure, and use—of personal information.”219  
 According to DeCew, there are three overlapping “clusters of privacy 
claims”:  informational privacy, accessibility privacy, and expressive  
privacy.220 Informational privacy involves “control over information about 
oneself.”221 Accessibility privacy is the limited-access concep-
tion:  “accessibility privacy focuses not merely on information or  
knowledge but more centrally on observations and physical proximity.”222 
Expressive privacy “protects a realm for expressing one’s self-identity or 
personhood through speech or activity.”223 Thus, DeCew combines three 
theories of privacy:  (1)  control over information;  (2)  limited access; 
and  (3)  personhood. 
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 Although cluster formulations appear more in line with the  
Wittgensteinian family resemblances approach, they still circumscribe pri-
vacy based on the boundaries of each of the clustered conceptions. Thus, 
merely aggregating conceptions of privacy together still leaves us with in-
sufficient guidance on how to understand privacy.  
 Thus far, I have merely challenged the traditional method by which 
privacy is conceptualized. If we turn away from the search for common 
denominators and the quest for the essence of privacy, how are we to con-
ceptualize privacy? I focus on this question in Part II. 
II 
Reconceptualizing Privacy:  A Pragmatic Approach 
 Because the existing method of conceptualizing privacy has thus far 
proven to be problematic and unsatisfying, I recommend a pragmatic ap-
proach to conceptualizing privacy. Pragmatism has many affinities with 
Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblances.224 As Stanley Cavell ex-
plains, Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblances demonstrates that 
“universals are neither necessary nor even useful in explaining how words 
and concepts apply to different things.”225 Cavell notes that “a new  
application of a word or concept will still have to be made out, explained, 
in the particular case, and then the explanations themselves will be  
sufficient . . . .”226 Likewise, pragmatism turns away from universals and 
focuses on specific situations.  
 Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblances frees us from engaging 
in the debate over necessary and sufficient conditions for privacy, from 
searching for rigid conceptual boundaries and common denominators. If 
we no longer look for the essence of privacy, then to understand the  
“complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing,”227 we 
should focus more concretely on the various forms of privacy and recog-
nize their similarities and differences. We should act as cartographers, 
mapping out the terrain of privacy by examining specific problematic  
situations rather than trying to fit each situation into a rigid predefined 
category. Judith Genova characterizes Wittgenstein’s views as the  
following:  “Knowledge is not a matter of guessing meanings, offering  
explanations, or other kinds of summaries that take law-like form,  
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but of listening to and observing the connections that obtain without  
interfering.”228 This is how the pragmatist approaches philosophical in-
quiry.  
 My approach to conceptualizing privacy draws from a few recurring 
ideas of pragmatism:229 a recognition of context and contingency, a rejec-
tion of a priori knowledge, and a focus on concrete practices. According to 
William James, the pragmatist “turns away from abstraction and  
insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed 
principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns 
towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and  
towards power.”230 As James observed, one of the more common ideas of 
pragmatism is a focus away from the notion of a priori knowledge—the 
view that there are objective and universal truths that exist prior to, and 
independently of, experience. According to the pragmatists, knowledge 
originates through experience.231  
 John Dewey’s philosophy is particularly useful to the task of recon-
ceptualizing privacy. According to Dewey, philosophical inquiry begins 
with problems in experience, not with abstract universal principles.232  
Philosophical inquiry must be “experimental,” beginning with problems in 
experience, making generalizations based on one’s encounters with these 
problems, and then testing these generalizations by examining their conse-
quences in other contexts.233 “Empirically, all reflection sets out from the 
problematic and confused. Its aim is to clarify and ascertain.”234 Specific 
problematic situations spur inquiry.235 “[K]nowledge is an affair of making 
sure,” Dewey observed, “not of grasping antecedently given sureties.”236  
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 A pragmatic approach to the task of conceptualizing privacy should 
not, therefore, begin by seeking to illuminate an abstract conception of pri-
vacy, but should focus instead on understanding privacy in specific contex-
tual situations. “[W]e never experience nor form judgments about objects 
and events in isolation,” observes Dewey, “but only in connection with a 
contextual whole.”237 Knowledge without its context loses much of its 
meaning, and we cannot ignore the “contextual situation in which thinking 
occurs.”238  
 Turning away from attempts to define privacy in the abstract does not 
mean abandoning the quest to conceptualize privacy. To the contrary, a 
legal or policy analysis of a privacy problem without attempting to under-
stand what privacy is represents a failure to define the problem adequately. 
Understanding the nature of a problem, what is at stake, and what impor-
tant values are in conflict, is necessary to guide the crafting of a solution.239 
According to Dewey, defining the problem involves careful observation 
along with an attempt to conceptualize by making generalizations and cre-
ating theories. Merely collecting facts will “lead nowhere.”240 “On the other 
hand,” observes Dewey, “it is possible to have the work of observation so 
controlled by a conceptual framework fixed in advance that the very things 
which are genuinely decisive in the problem in hand and its solution, are 
completely overlooked. Everything is forced into the predetermined  
conceptual and theoretical scheme.”241  
 Thus, although Dewey emphasizes that we must be careful not to al-
low conceptual schemas to impede our ability to assess concrete situations, 
he recognizes the importance of conceptualizing and formulating generali-
zations based on experience. For Dewey, the only way to “control and  
enrich concrete experience” is by making generalizations and theories.242 
As William James put it, “[t]he pragmatist clings to facts and concreteness, 
observes truth at its work in particular cases, and generalizes.”243 Accord-
ing to Dewey, the best way to avoid the problem of observation without 
direction on the one hand and observation overly distorted by one’s theo-
retical framework on the other hand is to maintain “sensitivity to the  
quality of the situation as a whole.”244 Thus, the pragmatist has a unique 
attitude toward conceptions. Conceptions are “working hypotheses,” not 
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fixed entities, and must be created from within concrete situations and con-
stantly tested and shaped through an interaction with concrete situations.245  
 Therefore, this Article advances an “approach” to understanding pri-
vacy rather than a definition or formula for privacy. It is an approach be-
cause it does not describe the sum and substance of privacy but provides 
guidance in identifying, analyzing, and ascribing value to a set of related 
dimensions of practices. An approach to conceptualizing privacy should 
aid in solving problems, assessing costs and benefits, and structuring social 
relationships. My approach is from the bottom up rather than the top down 
because it conceptualizes privacy within particular contexts rather than in 
the abstract.  
A. Privacy and Practices 
1. Social Practices 
 With its emphasis on the concrete, the factual, and the experienced 
situations, pragmatism locates the starting point for theorizing in specific 
contexts. Conceptualizing privacy is about understanding and attempting to 
solve certain problems. I contend that privacy problems involve disruptions 
to certain practices. By “practices,” I am referring broadly to various ac-
tivities, customs, norms, and traditions. Examples of practices include writ-
ing letters, talking to one’s psychotherapist, engaging in sexual intercourse, 
making certain decisions, and so on. Privacy is a dimension of these prac-
tices, and under my approach, privacy should be understood as part of 
these practices rather than as a separate abstract conception. As Robert Post 
aptly notes, privacy “cannot be reduced to objective facts like spatial  
distance or information or observability; it can only be understood by  
reference to norms of behavior.”246 
 Privacy is a dimension of certain practices and aspects of life. When I 
speak of privacy as a dimension of practices, I understand privacy to be an 
important (sometimes essential) constitutive part of particular practices. 
Understanding privacy requires us to look to the specific ways in which 
privacy manifests itself within practices and the degree to which privacy is 
linked to the purposes. When we state that we are protecting “privacy,” we 
are claiming to guard against disruptions to certain practices. Privacy inva-
sions disrupt and sometimes completely annihilate certain practices. Prac-
tices can be disrupted in certain ways, such as interference with peace of 
mind and tranquility, invasion of solitude, breach of confidentiality, loss of 
control over facts about oneself, searches of one’s person and property, 
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threats to or violations of personal security, destruction of reputation, sur-
veillance, and so on. 
 There are certain similarities in particular types of disruptions as well 
as in the practices that they disrupt; but there are differences as well. We 
should conceptualize privacy by focusing on the specific types of disrup-
tion and the specific practices disrupted rather than looking for the com-
mon denominator that links all of them. If privacy is conceptualized as a 
web of interconnected types of disruption of specific practices, then the act 
of conceptualizing privacy should consist of mapping the typography of 
the web. We can focus on particular points of the web. These “focal 
points” are not categories, and they do not have fixed boundaries. Rather, 
they are areas of the web where we are focusing, where we see certain 
things in more detail without being overwhelmed by the enormity of the 
whole web.  
 Particular types of disruption do not interfere with all privacy prac-
tices in the same way. For example, anonymity in authorship is a long-
standing practice that has the purpose of, among other things, promoting 
the unfettered expression of ideas. One form of disruption to this practice is 
the disclosure of concealed information. In this context, such disclosure 
involves revealing the identity of the author, and society protects against 
this disruption because of the importance of the purposes of anonymity. 
Disclosure also interferes with other practices. The disclosure of a person’s 
criminal past can interfere with that person’s ability to reform herself and 
build a new life. The value of protecting against such disclosures depends, 
in part, upon the social importance of rehabilitation. Since the purposes of 
the practices of anonymity and rehabilitation are different, the value of pro-
tecting against disclosures differs in these two contexts. 
 Another form of disruption is surveillance. Surveillance is a different 
kind of privacy problem than disclosure, imposing a different type of in-
jury to a different set of practices. Surveillance differs from disclosure be-
cause it can impinge upon practices without revealing any secrets. Being 
watched can destroy a person’s peace of mind, increase her self-
consciousness and uneasiness to a debilitating degree, and can inhibit her 
daily activities.247 We may want to protect against surveillance not merely 
to prevent disruptions of certain practices but to foster practices or to  
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structure society in a particular way (by restricting the power of the gov-
ernment or employers).  
 Turning our focus from disruptions to the practices they disrupt, we 
often refer to aspects of these practices as “private matters.” In other 
words, we say that certain things, places, and affairs are “private.” For a 
long time, philosophers have discussed what has become known as the 
public and the private spheres.248 Boundaries between the public and pri-
vate spheres create the conditions for developing or expressing various as-
pects of selfhood, forming certain kinds of interpersonal relationships, as 
well as engaging in certain forms of political activity.  
 The notion of public and private spheres understands privacy by way 
of a spatial metaphor. Often, theorists speak of privacy as a spatial realm, a 
sort of bubble zone that surrounds a person. According to legal theorist 
Milton Konvitz, privacy “is the claim that there is a sphere of space that 
has not been dedicated to public use or control.”249 According to Arnold 
Simmel, a sociologist, we establish: 
[a] territory . . . that is peculiarly our own. Its boundaries may be 
crossed by others only when we expressly invite them. Within 
these boundaries our own interests are sovereign, all initiative is 
ours, we are free to do our thing, insulated against outside  
influence and observation. This condition of insulation is what we 
call privacy.250  
The Supreme Court has often spoken of “zones” of privacy, understanding 
privacy by way of the spatial metaphor.251  
 Although it is difficult to talk about privacy without invoking some 
notion of space, the metaphor of space has significant limitations. As Lloyd 
Weinreb explains, reference to privacy as a “space” is metaphorical only 
and this metaphor is not very helpful because it “does not specify at all the 
shape or dimensions of the space or what it contains.”252 Privacy is not 
simply a form of space. An important dimension of privacy is informa-
tional control, which does not readily translate into spatial terms. Further, 
Katrin Byford aptly points out that this conception of privacy has difficulty 
grappling with the problems of privacy in cyberspace since cyberspace is 
not a physical space:  “A territorial view of privacy, which associates the 
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concept of privacy with the sanctity of certain physical spaces, has no  
application in a realm in which there is no space.”253 
 We can avoid allowing the metaphor of space to limit our understand-
ing of privacy yet still maintain a distinction between public and private. 
However, as I have argued, we should seek to understand practices rather 
than classify certain matters as public or private. Although classifying cer-
tain matters as public or private may be useful for certain general discus-
sions, such classifications can be misleading. In the next section, I explain 
why.  
2. Historical Development of Privacy Practices 
 It is reductive to carve the world of social practices into two spheres, 
public and private, and then attempt to determine what matters belong in 
each sphere. First, the matters we consider private change over time. While 
some form of dichotomy between public and private has been maintained 
throughout the history of Western civilization,254 the matters that have been 
considered public and private have metamorphosed throughout history due 
to changing attitudes, institutions, living conditions, and technology. The 
matters we consider to be private are shaped by culture and history, and 
have differed across cultures and historical epochs.  
 Second, although certain matters have moved from being public to 
being private and vice versa, the change often has been more subtle than a 
complete transformation from public to private. Particular matters have 
long remained private but in different ways; they have been understood as 
private but because of different attributes; or they have been regarded as 
private for some people or groups but not for others. In other words, to say 
simply that something is public or private is to make a rather general claim; 
what it means for something to be private is the central question. We con-
sider our Social Security number, our sexual behavior, our diary, and our 
home private, but we do not consider them private in the same way. A 
number of aspects of life have commonly been viewed as private:  the  
family, body, and home to name a few. To say simply that these things are 
private is imprecise because what it means for them to be private is differ-
ent today than it was in the past. I will demonstrate my point by tracing a 
brief genealogy of the privacy of the family, body, and home. 
a. Family 
 The family, viewed as the heart of the private sphere, was not always 
a sanctuary for privacy. Today, we often view the family as an institution 
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of intimacy, where a nuclear family lives together in the home, and has (or 
strives toward) a loving relationship. Further, the family is seen as gener-
ally enhancing individual self-realization.  
 However, for much of Western history (and still today in some cul-
tures), entry into marriage was not considered to be an individual autono-
mous choice based on selfhood-enhancing criteria. For many, marriages 
occurred not out of love or free choice, but were primarily controlled by 
parents and governed by economic and strategic concerns.255 Marriage was 
not an institution to develop the self through an intimate relationship with 
one’s family, but a set of social responsibilities and impediments to indi-
vidual self-development. In the world of the family, the individual was not 
free but regulated by different forms of authority,256 particularly for 
women, for whom marriage was often a life of submission. Indeed, the 
family was viewed as the locus of social control, a miniature monarchy 
ruled by the patriarch.257 For the expanding bourgeois, family life was inex-
tricably linked to professional life.258 The family was a business asset used 
in public commerce, a network of connections and interdependent reputa-
tions built upon conformity to social norms.259 The family existed for  
“sociability rather than privacy.”260  
 Of course, I am making broad generalizations, as certainly numerous 
families were not devoid of love, many marriages were initiated through 
individual choice, and many women were not completely subservient to the 
men in the household. My point is that in earlier times, certain attitudes and 
practices regarding the nature of the family were more prevalent and 
widely accepted than they are today. 
 Beginning in the nineteenth century, the family increasingly became 
more conducive to the private life of the individual,261 gradually shifting 
from an economic institution to a place of intimacy and self-fulfillment.262 
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Work and home began to be physically separated, creating a public profes-
sional world of business and a more private intimate world of the family. 
The growth of individualism—the “concept of the self as unique, and free 
to pursue his or her own goals; and a related decline in the idea that the  
overriding obligation was to the kin, the society, or the state”263—led to a 
rebellion against arranged marriages, transforming marriage into an institu-
tion of personal choice rather than of economic gain.264 Gradually, the fam-
ily began to develop into a “private entity focused into itself.”265 
 For women, the family was for a long time not associated with self-
development. According to Anita Allen, throughout much of history, 
“[m]arriage has been described as a woman’s greatest obstacle to  
privacy.”266 As Reva Siegel explains, a “wife was obliged to obey and 
serve her husband, and the husband was subject to a reciprocal duty to  
support his wife and represent her within the legal system.”267 Husbands 
could also physically punish their wives (known as “chastisement”) so long 
as no permanent injury was inflicted.268 Chastisement was justified by 
courts not wanting to interfere with marital privacy.269 As one court ex-
plained, although wife beating would typically be classified as an assault, 
doing so would “throw open the bedroom to the gaze of the public; and 
spread discord and misery, contention and strife, where peace and concord 
ought to reign.”270 Thus, ironically, “privacy” of the family consisted of an 
association of noninterference of the state in domestic affairs which served, 
as Siegel explains, “to enforce and preserve authority relations between 
man and wife.”271 This association has led to a number of feminist scholars 
attacking privacy in the domestic context.272  
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 That privacy of the family once meant the noninterference of the state 
in domestic affairs does not mean that this is inherently what privacy of the 
family means today. In contemporary American society, we accept greater 
government intervention in spousal relationships as well as in child rearing. 
To argue that there is less privacy of the family today because of this de-
velopment is too broad a claim. To the extent that family privacy consists 
of attributes such as independence, freedom of thought, freedom from co-
ercion, self-development, and pursuing activities of personal interest, gov-
ernment intervention actually can enhance privacy.  
b. Body 
 The evolution of attitudes toward the body is also instructive. For 
quite some time, theorists have viewed the body as at the core of privacy.273 
As the Supreme Court declared:  “No right is held more sacred, or is more 
carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to 
the possession and control of his own person.”274 The claim that the body is 
“private” is really a claim about certain practices regarding the body, such 
as concealment of certain bodily parts, secrecy about certain diseases and 
physical conditions, norms of touching and interpersonal contact, and indi-
vidual control and dominion over decisions regarding one’s body. As 
Radhika Rao explains, the constitutional right to privacy is often character-
ized by the notion of self-ownership of the body, the notion that a person 
belongs to herself.275 These attributes were certainly not always associated 
with the body. Although we currently associate the body with concealment 
(we hide the nude body from others under layers of clothes), the naked 
body was far from private in ancient Greece and Rome.276 Richard Sennett 
observes that in ancient Athens, the public display of the naked body 
“marked the presence of a strong rather than vulnerable person—and more, 
someone who was civilized.”277 Public nudity “affirmed one’s dignity as a 
citizen.”278 In the Middle Ages, it was not uncommon for people to bathe in 
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front of others,279 and bathing was often part of celebrations and social 
congregation.280  
 Norms of interpersonal contact and nudity gradually shifted toward 
more concealment and distancing from others. In the Renaissance, among 
the wealthy (and spreading to the middle class), people tried to distance 
themselves from their body and other’s bodies:  “men and women become 
more secretive and modest about bodily functions; they ceased to share 
beds with strangers at home, at school, or in inns. They ceased to eat and 
drink out of communal dishes and cups, which might contain traces of  
saliva of others.”281 After the sixteenth century, people became quite 
guarded about their bodies and reserved about their touching of others.282 
 Another contemporary association is between the body and conceal-
ment of certain bodily functions such as urination, defecation, and copula-
tion. In the seventeenth century, it was not anomalous for people to chat 
with friends while sitting above a chamber pot.283 Before the late nineteenth 
century, poor families (close to half of the population of England) lived in 
one room and had to urinate, defecate, and copulate in view of others.284 
This practice varied depending upon the wealth of families and where they 
lived. Families in urban areas often did not have a privy in the rear of their 
homes. As Lawrence Stone observes, “Up to the end of the eighteenth  
century, close-stools and chamber pots had been scattered randomly about 
the house in the public rooms, a system which afforded little or no  
privacy.”285  
 We also currently associate the body with individual control and do-
minion. Although many subscribe to John Stuart Mill’s observation that the 
individual is “sovereign” over her body,286 for a long time, people viewed 
their body (in particular, their blood) as belonging in part to the family and 
their ancestors.287 As attitudes toward the family changed and with new 
conceptions of individual identity, people began to view the body as their 
own possession.288  
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c. Home 
 A final example best illustrates the points I am attempting to 
make:  the home, often viewed as the quintessential place of privacy. To 
say the home is a “private” place is imprecise, because although it has long 
been viewed as a private space, it was so in a different way than it is now.  
 For a long time, the home has been regarded as one’s “castle,”289 
where the individual enjoyed a freedom from government intrusion. As 
early as 1886, in Boyd v. United States,290 the Court strictly protected “the 
sanctity of a man’s home.”291 The Court’s worship of the home has not wa-
vered, and almost a century later, the Court reiterated its staunch protection 
of the home:  “In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than 
when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s 
home.”292 This association has existed for a significant time and is embod-
ied in the Third Amendment’s prohibition of the quartering of troops in 
homes during peacetime,293 and the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 294 As the Court declared: “The Fourth 
Amendment, and the personal rights which it secures, have a long history. 
At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and 
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”295 
 Although the home was long associated as being a haven from the 
government, it still was not a place of solitude or individual  
self-development that it is today. Currently, the home is a place where the 
public is physically locked out.296 According to Justice Douglas, “[t]he 
home of course is the essence of privacy, in no way dedicated to public 
use, in no way extending an invitation to the public.”297 The home is under-
stood as a place where individuals retreat to find peace of mind and to  
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 292. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980). 
 293. U.S. Const. amend. III. 
 294. U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
 295. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). 
 296. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 107 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Our decisions 
indicate that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their homes in part because they have 
the prerogative to exclude others.”). 
 297. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 253 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring).  
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cultivate intimate relationships.298 Michelle Adams aptly describes the cur-
rent view of the home in Western societies as “a place of retreat to the (not  
always) protective sphere of family life, and it is reflective of, and a con-
duit for, familial and emotional intimacy.”299 Further, the home is associ-
ated with individual self-development, where each individual has the 
freedom to engage in personal activities that are not the business of others. 
Thus, in Stanley v. Georgia,300 the Court held that obscenity statutes could 
not “reach into the privacy of one’s own home. If the First Amendment 
means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting 
alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may 
watch.”301  
 Although today the home is seen as a place where one can retreat 
from the bustle of public life and enjoy tranquility and solitude, the home 
was not always routinely associated with such attributes. For much of his-
tory, many did not view the home as “the family’s haven and domestic  
retreat;” this concept became more widely held about 150 years ago and 
was at first limited to the urban middle classes.302 Many people unrelated to 
the family would be present in the home, such as apprentices, servants, and 
lodgers.303 As Tamara Hareven explains:  “[B]y contrast to the conception 
of the home in contemporary society as a private retreat from the outside 
world, to preindustrial society the family conducted its work and public 
affairs inside the household.”304 This, of course, is a generalization about 
the practices of particular families, mainly the families of shopkeepers in 
urban centers. For such families, business was conducted in the house, and 
the house was a crowded bustling place with little opportunity for the fam-
ily to retreat in isolation.305  
 Until the seventeenth century, many homes merely consisted of a 
large, multipurpose space.306 Among the rising bourgeois, homes were pri-
marily devoted to work, a shop with a place in the back or above to eat and 
sleep.307 Houses were hectic crowded places, often crammed with one or 
                                                                                                                          
 298. As William Pitt once remarked:  “The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to the 
Crown. It may be frail—its roof may shake—the wind may enter—the rain may enter—but the King of 
England cannot enter—all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!” Charles J. 
Sykes, The End of Privacy 83 (1999).  
 299. Michelle Adams, Knowing Your Place:  Theorizing Sexual Harassment at Home, 40 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 17, 23-24 (1998). 
 300. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
 301. Id. at 565. 
 302. Hareven, supra note 260, at 254. 
 303. Id. at 255.  
 304. Id. at 256.  
 305. Id. 
 306. Willaim H. Gass, Making Ourselves Comfortable, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1986, § 7 at 1. 
 307. Rybczynski, supra note 279, at 25. 
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more large families.308 Dwelling places were noisy, built of creaky wood 
with cracks and peepholes, equipped with no soundproofing to stop noise 
from echoing throughout the home.309 Beds were large, scarce, and 
crammed with multiple people.310 Not only would a couple sleep with their 
children, but even guests would share the bed.311 Even among the Puritans 
of colonial New England, a couple would think nothing of sleeping in the 
same bed with another adult.312 Before the development of specialized 
rooms, beds were placed in public areas and “family members slept behind 
curtains while social activities including outsiders were going on in other 
parts of the same room.”313  
 Beginning in the seventeenth century, homes began to be partitioned 
into rooms, each assigned a distinct purpose and some even becoming per-
sonalized according to their occupants.314 As specialized rooms became 
more prevalent, “bedrooms were no longer mixed up with public rooms, 
and began to be concentrated upstairs.”315 Even with rooms, solitude would 
often be disrupted because there were no corridors, and people would shuf-
fle through rooms to move about the house.316 
 Although solitude within the home developed first among the 
wealthy,317 there were special impediments to making the home a place of 
                                                                                                                          
 308. Flaherty, supra note 257, at 45. In eighteenth century New England, for example, families 
were twice as large on average as they are today, and a significant number of homes housed more than 
one family. See id. at 47.  
 309. As one historian observes about living quarters in Renaissance Europe:  “An apartment 
building was a public theater. Some held forth, others squabbled, but no one had any privacy. Marital 
disputes, illicit love affairs, noisy tenants, restless children—nothing could be concealed and everything 
could be heard.” Arlette Farge, Community, State, and Family:  Trajectories and Tensions:  The Honor 
and Secrecy of Families, in A History of Private Life III, supra note 261, at 575-76. In colonial 
New England, most houses were built entirely of wood. Spying on others was easy, and sound carried 
readily throughout the house. See Flaherty, supra note 257, at 43-44. 
 310. See, e.g., Rybczynski, supra note 279, at 28. 
 311. Flaherty, supra note 257, at 76. Crowded beds were due to the scarcity of beds and the 
need for warmth. See id. at 78. At inns, strangers would sometimes share the same bed. See Gottlieb, 
supra note 261, at 41. 
 312. Id. at 76.  
 313. Hareven, supra note 260, at 257. 
 314. Rybczynski, supra note 279, at 18; see also Flaherty, supra note 257, at 34 (describing 
crowded one-room homes of sixteenth and seventeenth century England). Even in the sixteenth 
century, most homes lacked separate rooms. Rybcynski, supra note 279, at 18. When rooms were 
assigned purposes, the house became divided into distinct areas for women and men. See Hall, supra 
note 262, at 91. Houses in America followed this same pattern of development. Flaherty, supra note 
257, at 33-44. 
 315. Stone, supra note 263, at 237. 
 316. Flaherty, supra note 257, at 40; see also Rybczynski, supra note 279, at 41 (“There were 
no corridors in these houses—each room was connected directly to its neighbor—and architects prided 
themselves on aligning all the doors enfilade, so that there was an unobstructed view from one end of 
the house to the other.”). 
 317. Only the aristocracy could afford to purchase the space necessary to maintain privacy. “The 
wealthy naturally increased the amount of private space available to them, but for the rest of the 
population, the vast majority, the idea of privacy did not extend beyond the bedroom, and perhaps not 
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solitude even among the affluent. According to Lawrence Stone, the 
wealthy owners of stately homes in England were “torn between the  
conflicting needs of their private selves and their public personae” because 
they wanted to maintain their houses to display their riches and status but 
also wanted privacy.318 The houses of the wealthy were continually on 
show.319 Further, servants, prone to gossip and even blackmail, prevented 
solitude in the home. Even in the eighteenth century, very wealthy families 
were unable to function without servants “even to the point of being unable 
to dress or undress without assistance.”320 Eventually, innovations such as 
plumbing, central heating, and gas and electric lighting limited the need for 
servants to be ever-present.321 
 The expansion of living space also contributed to the growing associa-
tion of solitude with the home. Among larger homes in the eighteenth cen-
tury, hallways emerged, permitting an unprecedented ability to be alone 
and undisturbed.322 Privacy began to be possible within certain special 
rooms—the study, for example, where the master of the house could with-
draw for quiet reading or for confidential conversations.323  
 When employment shifted from agriculture to factories and offices in 
the late nineteenth century, the homes of many began to be separated 
physically from the place of work.324 One’s professional life began to be 
viewed as a separate realm of existence from one’s life at home.325 The 
gradual separation of work from home helped to alter the nature of the 
family and the home. As Hareven notes:  “Following the removal of the 
workplace from the home as a result of urbanization and industrialization, 
the household was recast as the family’s private retreat, and home emerged 
as a new concept and existence.”326  
                                                                                                                          
beyond the bed curtains.” Orest Ranum, Forms of Privatization:  The Refuges of Intimacy, in A 
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 326. Hareven, supra note 260, at 259. 
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3. Privacy and Technological and Social Change 
 The preceding discussion illustrates that technological and social 
change alters the extent to which privacy is a dimension of certain practices 
as well as what we mean when we speak about certain practices as involv-
ing privacy. The history I related is told at an enormous level of generality; 
when historical practices regarding the family, body, and home are exam-
ined in more detail, there is a wide variation among such practices based on 
factors such as urbanization, class and social status, ethnic and religious 
subgroups, and so on. However, what I hope to have illustrated by the use 
of this brief historical sketch is that certain attitudes and practices were not 
universal, but were shaped by the realities of particular historical periods. 
The shrinking of the size of the family, emergence of new social places, 
transformation in the nature of the family, changing architecture of the 
home, new attitudes toward the body, increasing wealth and space, separa-
tion of home from work, decreased crowding, and numerous other changes 
in the quality and nature of life had profound effects for the perception of 
what the private life entailed. While we may long regard certain matters as 
“private,” what it currently means to call them “private” differs from what 
was meant in other times during history. 
 Although what is public and private is shaped by culture and history, I 
am not claiming that the privacy of the family, body, and home is merely a 
historical accident. Some practices involving privacy may have roots in our 
biological natures. In his analysis of privacy in primitive cultures, sociolo-
gist Barrington Moore observed a general preference for seclusion during 
sexual intercourse (although this did not always occur in practice).327 
Moore writes:  “[t]he fact that human beings can control certain impulses 
does not mean they lack these impulses. The human psyche is no blank 
slate upon which social training can write any message.”328 
 Even though certain matters and activities were not private in the way 
we understand them today, one could claim that we always desired them to 
be so, that such desire stems from biological need, and that this explains 
why they became private when technology or other practices enabled this 
to occur. Perhaps the interaction of biological desire and social practices 
creates the desire for privacy in certain contexts. Further sociological study 
is necessary to understand the origin of the desire for privacy in particular 
situations. This question, however, should not detract our focus from prac-
tices. Even if the privacy of certain matters stems in part from biological 
desire, we control our desires through practices, and a mere desire for  
privacy for a certain activity does not necessarily make such an activity 
private.  
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 One might object to my approach because of its evolving nature. If 
there is no consistent set of practices that should be considered private, 
how are we to determine what to protect as private? We must make such 
determinations by evaluating practices empirically, historically, and nor-
matively. Empirical and descriptive claims as to the current cultural under-
standings of privacy are very important in conceptualizing privacy. A 
conception of privacy must be responsive to social reality since privacy is 
an aspect of social practices. Since practices are dynamic, we must under-
stand their historical development. Looking historically at practices deep-
ens our understanding of the role that privacy has played in them and the 
effects that disruptions to them might cause.  
 However, privacy is not simply an empirical and historical question 
that measures the collective sense in any given society of what is and has 
long been considered to be private. Without a normative component, a 
conception of privacy can only provide a status report on existing privacy 
norms rather than guide us toward shaping privacy law and policy in the 
future. If we focus simply on people’s current expectations of privacy, our 
conception of privacy would continually shrink given the increasing sur-
veillance in the modern world. Similarly, the government could gradually 
condition people to accept wiretapping or other privacy incursions, thus 
altering society’s expectations of privacy.329 On the other hand, if we 
merely seek to preserve those activities and matters that have historically 
been considered private, then we fail to adapt to the changing realities of 
the modern world.  
 We want certain matters to be private, even if we need to create this 
privacy through the use of law. Privacy is an issue of power; it is not sim-
ply the general expectations of society, but the product of a vision of the 
larger social structure. For example, in America, the privacy of letters was 
formed in significant part by a legal architecture that protected the confi-
dentiality of letters from other people and government officials. In colonial 
America, mail was often insecure; it was difficult to seal letters; and the 
wax often used to keep letters sealed was not very effective.330 There was 
widespread suspicion of postal clerks reading letters; and a number of 
prominent individuals, such as Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and 
George Washington, decried the lack of privacy in their letters and would 
sometimes even write in code.331 As Ralph Waldo Emerson presumed, it 
was unlikely that “a bit of paper, containing our most secret thoughts, and 
                                                                                                                          
 329. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) (“[W]here an individual’s subjective 
expectations had been ‘conditioned’ by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment 
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 330. Smith, supra note 48, at 23-25.  
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protected only by a seal, should travel safety from one end of the world to 
the other, without anyone whose hands it had passed through having  
meddled with it.”332 Despite these realities, and people’s expectation that 
letters would not be confidential, the law evolved to provide strong protec-
tion of the privacy of letters. Benjamin Franklin, who was in charge of the 
colonial mails, required his employees to swear an oath not to open mail.333 
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Congress passed sev-
eral laws prohibiting the improper opening of mail.334 And the Supreme 
Court held in 1877 that despite the fact that people turned letters over to 
the government for delivery in the postal system, sealed parcels were pro-
tected from inspection by the Fourth Amendment.335 This example illus-
trates that privacy is not just found but constructed. By erecting a legal 
structure to protect the privacy of letters, our society shaped the practices 
of letter writing and using the postal system. It occurred because of the de-
sire to make privacy an integral part of these practices rather than to pre-
serve the status quo. 
 Therefore, determining what the law should protect as private depends 
upon a normative analysis, which requires us to examine the value of pri-
vacy in particular contexts. To do this, we must focus on our practices—
specifically, the nature of privacy in these practices, the role that privacy 
plays in these practices, and the ends that these practices further. Thus, the 
value of privacy is an important dimension of conceptualizing privacy, and 
I now turn to this issue. 
B. The Value of Privacy 
 One of the most integral aspects of conceptualizing privacy is to dis-
cern the value of privacy. The value of privacy not only illuminates what 
privacy is but also enables us to balance it with conflicting values. Under 
my approach, the value of privacy depends upon the purposes of the prac-
tices that are involved. Privacy is an issue of power; it affects how people 
behave, their choices, and their actions. When we seek to protect, create, 
disrupt, or halt certain practices, we are basing that decision on our view of 
the importance of the purposes of these practices. Practices are activities 
and modalities of living that have purposes,336 which means that practices 
are performed for particular reasons, aims, and goals. The value of privacy 
depends upon the importance of the purposes of the practices. 
 For example, when analyzing the value of the privacy of the home in 
order to make legal and policy decisions, we must look to the purposes of 
                                                                                                                          
 332. Quoted in Smith, supra note 48, at 56-57.  
 333. Id. at 49; Regan, supra note 211, at 46-49. 
 334. Smith, supra note 48, at 50-51. 
 335. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).  
 336. See Michael Sullivan & John T. Lysaker, Between Impotence and Illusion:  Adorno’s Art of 
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the privacy practices of the home. One such purpose is one’s ability in the 
home to escape from the hustle and bustle of the everyday world. Often, 
conflicting values clash with our desire to protect this purpose, such as the 
free speech rights of people to protest outside a person’s home or to broad-
cast into the home certain potentially offensive television and radio mes-
sages.337  
 Given the value of a particular practice, we must ask to what extent 
privacy is a dimension of that practice and, if so, how it impacts that prac-
tice. If privacy impacts the practice in a negative way, then less privacy 
would be desirable. If privacy furthers a desirable practice (or is so consti-
tutive of the practice that the practice would be impossible without it), then 
privacy should be recommended.  
 The way we shape practices depends upon our vision of the good, 
which informs how we wish to structure power in society and how we want 
to empower the self. The approach I advocate does not look to history to 
locate certain matters that always have been private; rather it looks to his-
tory to understand the development of certain practices and the manner in 
which power is exercised in society. 
 Of course, the current practices of society have significant weight in 
what we should protect as private. We may think that privacy is an unde-
sirable dimension of a certain practice or that a practice involving privacy 
is undesirable in its totality, but we must also recognize the costs of dis-
rupting these practices. One such cost is that unsettling existing practices 
can thwart people’s ability to exercise control over their lives. Although we 
might think that society would be better off if all medical information were 
public, the fact that most people take great pains to keep this information 
secret cannot be ignored. A law that runs counter to this practice could  
create profound psychological distress as well as changes in behavior that 
result in restricting personal freedom. Of course, I am not suggesting that 
we must avoid interfering with existing practices; however, our policy de-
cisions must account for the effects of such interference on people’s  
psychological well-being. Disruptions to certain practices affect other  
practices, and in many cases, affect the welfare, psyche, and freedom of 
individuals. 
 How, then, is privacy to be valued? First, I contend that privacy 
should be valued instrumentally. Second, in contrast to the discourse’s  
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tendency to value privacy in a general and abstract way, I argue that pri-
vacy must be valued contextually.  
 My first contention concerns the general method of valuation. Accord-
ing to many theorists, privacy has an intrinsic value, an inherently positive 
value.338 Ronald Dworkin, one of the principal proponents of intrinsic 
value, argues that certain things “are valuable in themselves and not just 
for their utility or for the pleasure or satisfaction they bring us.”339 Several 
privacy scholars who claim that privacy is valuable in itself locate the 
source of the value in a form of respect that must be provided to all rational 
beings. According to Stanley Benn:  “[R]espect for someone as a person, as 
a chooser, implie[s] respect for him as one engaged on a kind of  
self-creative enterprise, which could be disrupted, distorted, or frustrated 
even by so limited an intrusion as watching.”340 “[P]rivacy is valuable,” 
Julie Inness claims, “because it acknowledges our respect for persons as 
autonomous beings with the capacity to love, care and like—in other 
words, persons with the potential to freely develop close relationships.”341  
 However, along with other scholars,342 I contend that privacy has an 
instrumental value—namely, that it is valued as a means for achieving cer-
tain other ends that are valuable. As John Dewey observed, ends are not 
fixed, but are evolving targets, constantly subject to revision and change as 
the individual strives toward them.343 “Ends are foreseen consequences 
which arise in the course of activity and which are employed to give  
activity added meaning and to direct its further course.”344 
 In contrast to many conceptions of privacy, which describe the value 
of privacy in the abstract, I contend that there is no overarching value of 
privacy. For example, theories of privacy have viewed the value of privacy 
in terms of furthering a number of different ends. Fried claims that privacy 
fosters love and friendship. Bloustein argues that privacy protects dignity 
and individuality. Boling and Inness claim that privacy is necessary for 
intimate human relationships. According to Gavison, privacy is essential 
for autonomy and freedom. Indeed, there are a number of candidates for 
the value of privacy, as privacy fosters self-creation, independence,  
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autonomy, creativity, imagination, counter-culture, freedom of thought, 
and reputation. 
 However, no one of these ends is furthered by all practices of privacy. 
The problem with discussing the value of privacy in the abstract is that pri-
vacy is a dimension of a wide variety of practices each having a different 
value—and what privacy is differs in different contexts. My approach to-
ward conceptualizing privacy does not focus on the value of privacy gener-
ally. Rather, we must focus specifically on the value of privacy within 
particular practices.  
C. Practical Applications 
 Why should scholars and judges adopt my approach to conceptualiz-
ing privacy? To deal with the myriad of problems involving privacy, schol-
ars and judges will have to adopt multiple conceptions of privacy, or else 
the old conceptions will lead them astray in finding solutions. The Court’s 
1928 decision in Olmstead v. United States345 epitomizes the need for 
flexibility in conceptualizing privacy. The Court held that the wiretapping 
of a person’s home telephone (done outside a person’s house) did not run 
afoul of the Fourth Amendment because it did not involve a trespass inside 
a person’s home.346 Justice Louis Brandeis vigorously dissented, chastising 
the Court for failing to adapt the Constitution to new problems:  “[I]n the 
application of a Constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of what has 
been, but of what may be.”347 The Olmstead Court had clung to the 
outmoded view that the privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment was 
merely freedom from physical incursions. As a result, for nearly forty 
years, the Fourth Amendment failed to apply to wiretapping, one of the 
most significant threats to privacy in the twentieth century.348 Finally, in 
1967, the Court swept away this view in Katz v. United States,349 holding 
that the Fourth Amendment did apply to wiretapping. These events 
underscore the wisdom of Brandeis’s observations in Olmstead—the land-
scape of privacy is constantly changing, for it is shaped by the rapid pace 
of technological invention, and therefore, the law must maintain great 
flexibility in conceptualizing privacy problems.  
 This flexibility is impeded by the use of an overarching conception of 
privacy. Trying to solve all privacy problems with a uniform and  
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overarching conception of privacy is akin to using a hammer not only to 
insert a nail into the wall but also to drill a hole. Much of the law of infor-
mation privacy was shaped to deal with particular privacy problems in 
mind. The law has often failed to adapt to deal with the variety of privacy 
problems we are encountering today. Instead, the law has attempted to ad-
here to overarching conceptions of privacy that do not work for all privacy 
problems. Not all privacy problems are the same, and different conceptions 
of privacy work best in different contexts. Instead of trying to fit new prob-
lems into old conceptions, we should seek to understand the special cir-
cumstances of a particular problem. What practices are being disrupted? In 
what ways does the disruption resemble or differ from other forms of dis-
ruption? How does this disruption affect society and social structure? 
These are some of the questions that should be asked when grappling with 
privacy problems. In the remainder of this section, I will discuss several 
examples that illustrate these points. 
 The case of McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc.350 demonstrates 
the deficiencies of failing to recognize the distinctiveness of particular 
privacy invasions. In McNamara, a newspaper published a photo of a high 
school soccer player’s genitalia that he inadvertently exposed while 
running on the soccer field. The student sued under the tort of public 
disclosure of private facts, in which one is liable for widely publicizing “a 
matter concerning the private life of another” that “would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person” and “is not of legitimate concern to the 
public.”351 The student contended that the newspaper “violated the bounds 
of public decency” and “could have used one of its other numerous 
photographs in its article.”352 The court held that the student’s case should 
be dismissed because “[t]he picture accurately depicted a public event and 
was published as part of a newspaper article describing the game. At the 
time the photograph was taken, [the student] was voluntarily participating 
in a spectator sport at a public place.”353 
 Although not explicitly stated, the court appeared to be 
conceptualizing privacy as a form of secrecy, which is violated by the 
disclosure of concealed facts. Since the photograph was taken outside and 
in public, the student could not claim that an image of his exposed genitals 
was a private matter. Courts routinely employ this reasoning in cases 
involving the tort of public disclosure of private facts.354 Appearing in 
public, according to one court, “necessarily involves doffing the cloak of 
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privacy which the law protects.”355 For example, in Penwell v. Taft 
Broadcasting Co., the court dismissed a public disclosure action for the 
filming and broadcast of the wrongful arrest of a married couple because 
the arrest was filmed in a place “left open to the public eye.”356  
 The McNamara court, however, applied an inappropriate conception 
of privacy in deciding the case. The injury was not one caused by the 
disclosure of concealed information, but one of what I will call “exposure.” 
Exposure differs from disclosure in that with exposure, no secrets or 
concealed information are revealed. Exposure involves the exposing of 
certain physical or emotional attributes which, based upon social practices, 
are often kept out of view of others. For example, it is common knowledge 
that people urinate and defecate. Revealing the fact that a person urinates 
or defecates is not what privacy is about in this context, for it is no secret 
that people eliminate waste. Further, absent any unusual physical features, 
the nude body does not reveal secrets or facts about a person. Nevertheless, 
people currently take great strides to cloak their nude bodies and to urinate 
and defecate away from other people. As discussed earlier, these practices 
developed over a long span of history, but are today deeply entrenched in 
most societies.357 A candid photograph of a person in the nude or engaged 
in elimination of waste engenders deep embarrassment and distress for 
most people. If no secrets are being disclosed, why are people so upset 
about this form of exposure?  
 The answer, I believe, is that social practices have developed to 
conceal aspects of life that we find animal-like or disgusting as well as 
activities in which we feel particularly vulnerable and weak. We scrub, 
dress, and groom ourselves in order to present ourselves to the public in a 
dignified manner. We seek to cover up smells, discharge, and excretion 
because we are socialized into viewing them with disgust. We cloak the 
nude body in public based on norms of decorum. These social practices, 
which relegate these aspects of life to the private sphere, are deeply 
connected to human dignity.358 Dignity is, in part, the ability to transcend 
                                                                                                                          
 355. Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 391 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Mass. App. 1979). 
 356. Penwell v. Taft Broad. Co., 469 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (Ohio App. 1984). 
 357. See supra Part II.A. 
 358. This conception of privacy would more appropriately account for the recent controversy over 
the autopsy photographs of Dale Earnhardt, a famous race car driver who died while racing in 2001. 
Over thirty photographs were taken of Earnhardt’s cadaver. Earnhardt’s wife sought to keep the 
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photographs constitutes a unique, serious, and extraordinarily intrusive invasion of the personal privacy 
of that person’s surviving family members.” Earnhardt v. Volusia County Office of the Med. Exam’r, 
No. 2001-30373-CICI, slip op. at 7 (7th Cir. July 9, 2001). The court further stated that “[t]here is a 
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one’s animal nature, to be civilized, to feel worthy of respect. Indeed, one 
form of torture is to dehumanize and degrade people by making them dirty, 
stripping them, forcing them to eliminate waste in public, and so on.359 
When social practices relating to dignity are disrupted, the result can be a 
severe and sometimes debilitating humiliation and loss of self-esteem.360 
Therefore, the fact that the student’s genitalia was exposed to the public 
may have eliminated its secrecy, but the injury was not one of lost secrecy. 
The fact that the exposure occurred in a public place should have been 
treated as relatively unimportant.  
 Another example demonstrates how the approach of conceptualizing 
privacy articulated in this Article will shift the focus of the courts to more 
pertinent and appropriate considerations. In Nader v. General Motors 
Corp.,361 Ralph Nader, a prominent public figure and outspoken critic for 
consumer safety, criticized the safety of General Motors’ automobiles for 
many years. General Motors interviewed Nader’s friends and acquaintan-
ces to learn the private details of his life, made threatening and harassing 
phone calls, wiretapped his telephone and eavesdropped into his conversa-
tions, hired prostitutes to entrap him into an illicit relationship, and kept 
him under pervasive surveillance while outside in public places.362  
 The court proceeded to analyze one-by-one each of the particular acts 
of General Motors. The court held that interviewing Nader’s friends was 
not an invasion of privacy:  “Information about the plaintiff which was  
already known to others could hardly be regarded as private to the  
plaintiff.”363 The harassing phone calls and the prostitutes did not involve 
“intrusion for the purpose of gathering information of a private and  
confidential nature.”364 The wiretapping, however, was a well-established 
tortious intrusion.365 On the question of the pervasive surveillance, the 
court held that although observation “in a public place does not amount to 
an invasion of . . . privacy,” in certain instances, “surveillance may be so 
‘overzealous’ as to render it actionable.”366 As the court illustrated:  “A 
person does not automatically make public everything he does merely by 
being in a public place, and the mere fact that Nader was in a bank did not 
give anyone the right to try to discover the amount of money he was  
                                                                                                                          
substantial injury to families when strangers are permitted carte blanche to go through their loved ones’ 
autopsy photographs. In a decent society that should be recognized per se.” Id. at 9.  
 359. These techniques were among those employed by the Nazis during the Holocaust. 
 360. See, e.g., William Ian Miller, The Anatomy of Disgust 147 (1997) (“Clearly defecation 
is degrading and contaminating. It is hedged in with rules about appropriateness as to place. And to 
violate those rules is a cause for disgrace and shame.”).  
 361. 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970). 
 362. See id. at 767. 
 363. Id. at 770. 
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withdrawing.”367 Thus, the court held that this issue depended “on the  
nature of the proof.”368 Based on its example, however, surveillance in pub-
lic would constitute an invasion of privacy only if it revealed certain facts 
or information commonly deemed “private” such as financial information. 
 In a well-reasoned concurring opinion, Judge Brietel contended that 
although the common-law privacy torts are “subdivided . . . into separate 
classifications,” these classifications are neither “frozen or exhausted.”369 
According to Brietel, “it is premature to hold that the attempted entrapment 
of plaintiff in a public place by seemingly promiscuous ladies is no  
invasion of any of the categories of the right to privacy.”370 Further, Brietel 
reasoned, “while allegations treated singly may not constitute a cause of 
action, they may do so in combination, or serve to enhance other violations 
of the right to privacy.”371 
 As Brietel’s concurrence correctly noted, the majority lost sight of the 
forest for the trees. The purpose of General Motors’ plan was to employ its 
considerable power in a campaign to disrupt Nader’s personal affairs. The 
court should have focused on the way in which the company’s actions 
aimed to disrupt Nader’s life, and the paramount social importance of 
avoiding such exercises of power designed to deter, harass, and discredit 
individuals, especially ones who are attempting to raise important social 
and political issues. General Motors focused its assault on personal aspects 
of Nader’s life:  his friends, his sexual behavior, his conversations, and his 
daily activities. These are aspects of life we commonly consider to be pri-
vate, and with regard to Nader, these aspects of his life were irrelevant to 
the consumer advocacy issues he was raising against General Motors. The 
disruption involved in this case was not a loss of secrecy, as nothing in this 
case indicates that any of Nader’s secrets were uncovered or disclosed. 
Much of the information gleaned by General Motors was not intimate. 
There was no evidence that General Motors discovered any embarrassing 
facts or that Nader’s reputation was harmed. Nor was there a loss of control 
over information. Rather, the facts of this case suggest a different type of 
disruption, one that should be conceptualized from the bottom up by focus-
ing on the situation at hand. General Motors’ campaign of harassment, sur-
veillance, and investigation created a form of systemic oppressiveness, an 
exercise of power that is profoundly suffocating and threatening to a per-
son’s private life. This type of power has a significant potential to render 
people vulnerable and helpless, as if they are hunted prey or prisoners un-
der constant guard.  
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 371. Id. 
2002] CONCEPTUALIZING PRIVACY 1151 
 
 Instead of dissecting the situation and placing each invasion into preex-
isting categories of privacy, the court should have assessed the whole situa-
tion. By slicing off parts of the case and compartmentalizing them into 
categories, the court impeded a jury’s ability to consider the full situation. 
Certain disruptions, such as the one in Nader, are created cumulatively by 
the aggregation of isolated acts which together can be oppressive. In short, 
rather than look for isolated privacy harms based on existing categories, the 
court should have focused on social practices and their disruption. This 
focus would have enabled the court to better assess the nature and effects 
of the power that General Motors exercised. Indeed, one of the most impor-
tant reasons for protecting privacy is to prevent stifling exercises of power 
employed to destroy or injure individuals. 
 A third application of the pragmatic approach to conceptualizing pri-
vacy demonstrates the profound problems with clinging to a particular con-
ception of privacy that is not well-suited for grappling with the privacy 
problems of the Information Age. In a series of decisions, the Court, viewing 
privacy as secrecy, held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for 
information known by or exposed to third parties. In United States v. 
Miller,372 the Court concluded that a person does not have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in her financial records kept by her bank.373 Analogiz-
ing to a series of cases in which a person’s friend betrays their secret or a 
person divulges information to a police informant or undercover officer,374 
the Court concluded that “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the  
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to 
Government authorities.”375 Similarly, in Smith v. Maryland,376 the Court 
held that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in pen registers (a 
listing of the phone numbers a person dials) because they were turned over 
to third persons (phone companies).377 Since people “know that they must 
convey numerical information to the phone company” and that the phone 
company can and does record this information, people cannot “harbor any 
general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.”378 
 The Court’s jurisprudence in these cases conceptualizes privacy as a 
form of total secrecy; however, this conception is ill-suited for the  
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circumstances involved in these cases. The people we call, the papers we 
discard, and our financial records are commonly understood as private mat-
ters even though third-parties may have access to (or even possess) that 
information. We expect privacy because we do not expect unauthorized 
persons to delve through this information. Indeed, we often share informa-
tion in various relationships, some of which the law strongly protects, such 
as those between attorney and client and between patient and physician.379 
Life in the modern Information Age often involves exchanging information 
with third parties, such as phone companies, Internet service providers, 
cable companies, merchants, and so on. Thus, clinging to the notion of pri-
vacy as total secrecy would mean the practical extinction of privacy in to-
day’s world. In contrast to the notion of privacy as secrecy, privacy can be 
understood as an expectation in a certain degree of accessibility of infor-
mation.380 This is not the only way to conceptualize privacy, but it is more 
appropriate as an account of modern practices, where cumulatively, we 
disclose a tremendous amount of data in various settings and transactions. 
 Finally, the importance of applying my approach toward conceptualiz-
ing privacy is illustrated by the current difficulties of courts in grappling 
with privacy problems created by the collection and use of personal infor-
mation in today’s Information Age. I do not believe that these problems 
can be conceptualized under the same paradigms as other privacy prob-
lems.381 By conceptualizing using the metaphors and understandings of 
privacy created to solve other privacy problems, judges and legal scholars 
have not yet been able to adequately grapple with the privacy problems 
created by the collection and use of personal information. For example, in 
U.S. West, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,382 a telecommuni-
cations carrier challenged on First Amendment grounds the privacy  
regulations of the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), which 
restricted the use and disclosure of customers’ personal information unless 
the customers gave their consent. The court, which determined that the 
regulations involved a restriction on commercial speech, analyzed the  
regulations under the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny test.383 In con-
cluding that the regulations failed the Central Hudson test, the court rea-
soned that the FCC’s asserted state interest in protecting consumer privacy 
was not “substantial.”384 Noting that privacy was a very broad concept, the 
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court held that the FCC did not “specify the particular notion of privacy 
and the interest served.”385 The court, however, harbored its own implicit 
conception of what would constitute a privacy invasion: 
[T]he government must show that the dissemination of the  
information desired to be kept private would inflict specific and 
significant harm on individuals, such as undue embarrassment or 
ridicule, intimidation or harassment, or misappropriation of  
sensitive personal information for the purposes of assuming  
another’s identity.386 
The court further stated that a “general level of discomfort from knowing 
that people can readily access information about us does not necessarily 
rise to the level of a substantial state interest under Central Hudson for it is 
not based on an identified harm.”387  
 The U.S. West court was too fixated on a conception of privacy that 
viewed its invasion as a discrete harm, akin to a tort harm, where the indi-
vidual is left with specific injuries that can be readily translated into dam-
ages (for example, a ruined reputation, a broken leg, psychological trauma, 
and so on). This, however, is a constrained way to view the disruption cre-
ated by the aggregation and uncontrolled uses of personal information by 
private sector bureaucracies. This disruption of the way that power is allo-
cated between individuals and large corporations goes to the structure of 
our society as a whole. This problem differs from the disclosure of a secret, 
the exposure of a nude body, or the pervasive surveillance of an individual. 
It is a problem that goes to the heart of what type of society we are con-
structing as we move headfast into the Information Age.  
 I have discussed the privacy problem created by the collection and use 
of personal information by private sector companies at length elsewhere.388 
Although many disruptions of privacy practices involve the disclosure of 
secrets, much of the information collected about individuals in databases 
consists of day-to-day, often nonsecret information such as name, address, 
phone number, race, gender, birth date, and so on. Trying to fit the problem 
into the conception of privacy as secrecy will not illuminate the problem 
very well; in fact, important aspects of the problem will be ignored or mar-
ginalized. The conception of privacy as intimacy fails to capture the  
problem in this context because for the most part, databases do not invade 
or disrupt our intimate lives. Our names, addresses, types of cars we own, 
and so on are not intimate facts about our existence, certainly not equiva-
lent to our deeply held secrets or carefully guarded diary entries. In  
                                                                                                                          
 385. Id. at 1235. 
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. 
 388. See Solove, supra note 83. 
1154  CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1087 
 
cyberspace, most of our relationships are more like business transactions 
than intimate interpersonal relationships.  
 The conception of privacy as control over information only partially 
captures the problem. The problem is also engendered by the process by 
which the information is collected, processed, and used—a process which 
itself is out of control. In other words, what makes this problem significant 
is the fact that this information is aggregated, that it can be used to make 
important decisions about people’s lives, that it is often subjected to a bu-
reaucratic process lacking much discipline and control, and that the indi-
vidual has scant knowledge of how the information is processed and used. 
Therefore, existing conceptions of privacy have not adequately accounted 
for this problem. The problem can be better understood and dealt with by 
conceptualizing privacy from the bottom up, beginning with the problem 
itself rather than trying to fit the problem into a general category.  
Conclusion 
 Thus far, attempts to locate a common denominator for conceptualiz-
ing privacy have been unsatisfying. Conceptions that attempt to locate the 
core or essence of privacy wind up being too broad or too narrow. I am not 
arguing that we must always avoid referring to privacy in the abstract; 
sometimes it is easiest and most efficient to do so. Rather, such abstract 
reference to privacy often fails to be useful when we need to conceptualize 
privacy to solve legal and policy problems. Therefore, it may be worth-
while to begin conceptualizing privacy in a different way. 
 A bottom-up contextualized approach toward conceptualizing privacy 
will prove quite fruitful in today’s world of rapidly changing technology. 
Of course, in advocating a contextual analysis of privacy, the issue re-
mains:  At what level of generality should the contexts be defined? This is 
a difficult question, and I doubt there is a uniform level of generality that is 
preferable. This Article does not recommend that contexts be defined so 
narrowly as to pertain to only a few circumstances. It is often useful to de-
fine contexts of some breadth, so long as the generalization is not overly 
reductive or distorting. All generalization is an imperfection. Focusing on 
particular contexts and practices is a way of carving up experience into 
digestible parts. The human mind simply cannot examine experience in its 
chaotic totality:  it must bite off pieces to analyze.  
 The way we conceptualize privacy in each context profoundly influ-
ences how we shape legal solutions to particular problems. We can evalu-
ate the results of our conceptions by looking to how well they work in 
solving the problems. Although I critique attempts to locate an overarching 
conception of privacy, I am certainly not arguing against endeavors to con-
ceptualize privacy. Conceptualizing privacy in particular contexts is an 
essential step in grappling with legal and policy problems. Thus, the issue 
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of how we conceptualize privacy is of paramount importance for the  
Information Age, for we are beset with a number of complex privacy prob-
lems, causing great disruption to numerous important practices of high so-
cial value. With the method of philosophical inquiry I am recommending, 
we can better understand, and thus more effectively grapple with, these 
emerging problems.  
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